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Abstract 
 
Over the last decades management and organization researchers have paid quite a lot of 
attention to the rise of knowledge intensive companies and society‟s shift to a knowledge 
economy in general. Some researchers have noted that professional service companies will 
become “even more prominent in the economies the world over” (Greenwood, Deephouse & 
Li 2007: 4). At the core of knowledge intensive companies is this “little something” - esoteric 
knowledge - that although cannot be touched by hand, if used correctly, will turn into 
something powerful. However, the nature and distinction of professional service firms (PSFs) 
is still blurry. Which kinds of companies belong to this category and which do not? The 
existing theory and taxonomy of PSFs needs to be the subject of further empirical testing. 
Since a lot of the former literature has focused on the “classical” examples of PSFs, it is now 
essential to analyse some less studied industries.  
 
On the other hand, it is clear that the IT sector and knowledge intensity are strongly tied to 
each other. Every year numerous new IT companies are established and a lot of hopes and 
finance is put into those. However, although knowledge also forms the core of the 
competitiveness of many IT start-ups, no relevant literature studying these types of 
companies from the perspective of knowledge intensive firms exists. This is necessary as 
attention to the employee side of start-ups may help to expand the understanding of start-ups 
and help them to overcome their challenges. For the organization sociological standpoint it is 
important to get a deeper understanding of software development companies and find out 
their position among other professional service firms.  
  
With this thesis in mind, I propose to highlight some aspects of IT start-ups, take a look at 
them as professional service companies and compare these empirical findings with the 
existing theory and typology of PSFs. An important analytical aim of this thesis is 
clarification of concepts – mainly the concept of professional service firms, but to a smaller 
extent also the concept of start-up companies. Therefore, much of the purpose of the chosen 
research methodology and the thesis in its entirety is such a clarification.  
 
 
 
4 
 
This study has four research questions: 
 
1. Which are the main organizational and/or managerial characteristics of an IT start-up? 
2. To what extent do the organizational peculiarities of IT start-ups arise from their 
knowledge intensity and to what extent from their specific start-up context?  
3. By which aspects are IT start-ups similar to and different from other types of 
professional service firms? 
4. How suitable is the existing theory and taxonomy of professional service firms to 
describing start-ups in the software development industry?  
 
I approached the topic qualitatively, through a comparative case study. I combined secondary 
data on two cases - two IT start-ups - with interviews conducted with their founders, CEOs 
and knowledge workers. Empirical findings are seen through the lenses of former research on 
start-up companies and professional service firms. By doing that, the thesis analyses the 
suitability of the theory and taxonomy of professional service firms developed by 
Nordenflycht (2010) to describe professional service start-ups in the software development 
industry.  
 
As a result of the study, I propose a three layer model which integrates influences and 
knowledge from the start-up world and industry side with peculiarities and knowledge 
coming from the worker side. I argue that start-ups in the software development sector can be 
seen as professional service firms and these are characterized by some common PSF 
peculiarities, challenges and organizational responses. On the other hand, many aspects that 
are found to characterize classic PSFs are missing in the case of start-ups in the software 
development industry. These are professionalization, an opaque quality problem, muted 
competition, trusteeship norms and organizational slack. This clear distinction of classic PSFs 
from other kinds of PSFs, and at the same time strong knowledge intensity within these firms, 
is proof of the need for taxonomy of PSFs. But, when comparing these features with the 
existing taxonomy of PSFs, these firms would not suit directly either of the categories. 
Therefore, I suggest that an additional category that includes these types of companies and 
reflects their peculiarities would be needed.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
 
The current thesis about software development start-ups as professional service firms consists 
of five main chapters. First it gives an introduction to the theme through presenting the cases, 
the potential significance of the topic, research questions and limitations. It further gives an 
overview of related literature and research design and methodology through describing and 
reasoning both the general approaches behind this study, as well as the selection of particular 
cases, participants, data gathering and analysis methods. The section ends by raising the 
issues concerning research quality, ethics and the influence of my personal background. In 
Chapter 4 I present the main findings from my field work categorized and summarized in 
tables. These findings are further developed and discussed, as well as seen through the lenses 
of existing theories in Chapter 5. The thesis ends with a quick look at the main issues and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
1.2 Short description of cases 
 
In this thesis I approach the research questions through two cases: two start-up companies 
operating in the IT industry. 
 
The first of them, Fraktal, was established in 2007 in Estonia. It is a web design and software 
studio, and until 2011 its main field of activity was developing and marketing a web-based 
software service named Edicy. However, in addition to that the company has been offering 
webpage design, programming and consulting services. Until 2011 Edicy was a web service 
brand developed and supported by the Fraktal team, but in October 2011 Fraktal divided into 
two separate companies - Fraktal OÜ and Edicy OÜ. Although the core human resource of 
these companies continues the same, since January 2012 these teams have moved to become 
more separate from each other. The main field of activity for Edicy is now developing and 
marketing Edicy. Today the two companies together employ 14 employees, mainly web 
developers and designers, and 4-6 of them work full time on the Edicy side.  
 
Edicy is global service that aims to provide simple and beautiful website building for small- 
and medium-sized enterprises around the world. Its main competitive edge is being a 
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multilingual website builder, which means companies around the world can build a website 
by themselves, using their own mother tongue (as opposed to the many mostly English-based 
website builders on the market). As of January 2012 Edicy is available in 16 different 
languages, it has 300 000 signups, 10 000 active users and 900 paying customers worldwide, 
and its monthly revenue is $14,000. The aim of Edicy is to reach an annual revenue of $10 
000 000 in five years and to get 100 000 paying customers.  
 
My second case in this study is ZeroTurnaround. It was established in 2007 in Estonia as a 
spin-off company from an international software company. It became juridically independent 
in 2009. Currently the firm employs 59 persons and two of its offices are situated in Estonia, 
one in Prague and one in Boston, U.S. ZeroTurnaround is a software company that is 
improving the everyday work of Java developers by offering them two services: JRebel and 
LiveRebel. JRebel is a Java virtual machine-plugin that makes the work of Java programmers 
more efficient and reduces programming installation time, thereby decreasing production 
costs by 16%. LiveRebel is a Java server management tool, designed for making automated, 
instant updates to Java applications in production without server downtime. 
 
Within only a couple of years, JRebel is now used by more than 18 000 customers in over 65 
countries. In 2010, the company‟s revenue was approximately $850 000 and its growth 
compared to 2009 was 760%. ZeroTurnaround has experienced 2-4 times growth year on 
year, for the past 4 years since it was founded. Its customers include many global financial 
services providers, e.g., the Bank of America, as well as American Airlines, Lufthansa, 
LinkedIn, HP, Siemens, Logica, Kayak, Oracle, IBM and more. Its largest markets are 
Europe and the U.S. 
 
Although somewhat different, both of these companies are examples of start-up companies. 
In the current thesis I will focus on these two companies as cases worth studying in detail.  
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1.3 Potential societal significance 
 
Fast development of technology during the last decades is a phenomenon that has been an 
important factor behind social change and thus, been much talked about. The Internet has 
sped up the process of globalization,, creating a whole new reality, possibilities and 
challenges for us to handle. The decline of the industrial sector in many countries is directly 
related to the increase in the service and technology sector, and it is assumed that this 
tendency will continue in the future. In the information technology industry companies 
compete fiercely for brilliant ideas, knowing that only the very best of them are rewarded 
with global success and enormous financial benefits. It is a paradox that the greatest financial 
outcome and popularity is related to projects that we cannot touch physically (Google, 
Facebook, Skype, Angry Birds etc.), but that nevertheless influence to a large extent our 
everyday life, communication and attitudes. 
 
On the other hand, over recent decades another phenomenon has become widely discussed in 
the global setting. Starting in the early 1970s with Daniel Bell‟s prophecy of the post-
industrial society where theoretical knowledge plays a substantial role (Bell 1976), 
management and organization researchers have paid much attention to the rise of knowledge 
intensive companies and society‟s shift to a knowledge economy in 
general. Scientific knowledge is considered as the engine of much of the dynamics of 
economic activity (McGrath 1994: 17). Information is seen to have taken a central position in 
society and modern society is characterized by knowledge accumulation: generating, 
collecting, processing and transforming information is now a fundamental source for 
productivity and power (Thompson & McHugh 2002: 150). Knowledge intensive companies 
stand in the middle of these phenomena and as some researchers have noted, professional 
service companies will become “even more prominent in the economies the world over” 
(Greenwood, Deephouse & Li 2007: 4). Drucker believes that the productivity of knowledge 
and knowledge workers (as the core employees of the knowledge industry) will become the 
decisive competitive factor in the developed world, forcing managers to adopt radically new 
management practices (McGrath 1999: 15). Just as it is in the case of the greatest success 
stories in the IT industry, at the core of knowledge intensive companies is this “little 
something” - esoteric knowledge - that although cannot be touched by hand, if used correctly, will 
turn into something powerful.. This makes the analysis and understanding of knowledge 
intensive companies crucial for the modern knowledge-oriented society.  
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As we can see, the IT sector and knowledge intensity are strongly tied to each other. Every 
year numerous new technology companies are established that are based on some kind of 
specific knowledge. Most of them hope to become the next conqueror of the world. Some of 
them are called “start-up companies” as they share a certain nature and they can be 
characterized by some common peculiarities. Also the much spoken category of knowledge 
intensive companies can be divided into smaller parts and described by some common 
characteristics. However, considering the last term, the situation is a bit more complicated 
and needs further attention and investigation from organization researchers. 
 
1.4 Potential sociological significance 
 
Technology start-ups are often studied with regard to their finance and other elements which 
are seen as the most important features while establishing an IT start-up company. Although 
knowledge forms the basis of the competitiveness of many IT start-ups, I did not manage to 
find any relevant literature about studying these types of companies from the perspective of 
knowledge intensive firms. Does the attention to the employee side of start-ups expand the 
understanding of start-ups and help them to overcome their challenges? Is there anything to 
learn for start-ups from the existing studies of knowledge intensive organizations? 
 
However, the nature and distinction of professional service firms is still quite blurry. Which 
kinds of companies belong to this category and which do not? As Nordeflycht (2010) has 
noted, the theory and taxonomy of PSFs needs to be the subject of further empirical testing. It 
gives us reasons to believe that the theory does not yet cover all the important aspects of 
PSFs and in addition, to the named peculiarities and managerial challenges there may be 
further features characteristic to these types of firms. Nordenflycht expresses the need for 
looking at the intra-industrial variations and to test if organizations that belong to one 
common category on paper stand close to each other in reality as well. Since a lot of the 
former literature has focused on the “classical” examples of PSFs, it is now essential to 
analyse some less studied industries. According to his research on the field, software 
development has been mentioned as professional service companies in only four cases of the 
total of 22 (Nordenflycht 2007: 41). However, as pure knowledge firms, this type of 
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organization is at the core of Nordenflycht‟s model of professional service firms, which is 
created based on their different asset intensities (Nordenflycht 2007).  
 
So, considering these shortcomings, it would be sociologically interesting and also needed in 
practice to connect these two bodies of knowledge. For the organization sociological 
standpoint it is important to get a deeper understanding of software development companies 
and find out their position among other professional service firms (PSFs). More narrowly - do 
software development start-ups qualify as knowledge intensive PSFs and can they be 
compared to other PSFs? Is it thus possible to extrapolate the knowledge collected on other 
PSFs to cover these types of companies? 
 
With this thesis in mind, I propose to highlight IT start-ups, take a look at them as professional 
service companies and compare these empirical findings with the existing theory and 
typology of PSFs. 
 
1.5 Framework and general research questions 
 
An important analytical aim of this thesis is clarification of concepts – the concept of 
professional service firms and start-up companies. Therefore, much of the purpose of the 
chosen research methodology (comparative case study) and the thesis in its entirety is such a 
clarification. 
 
Although it is possible to analyse knowledge intensity and challenges/possibilities tied to this 
also on a societal, macro level through the views of the new information society or 
knowledge economy, I have chosen to focus on the meso perspective by studying the topic 
from the industry and organizational angle. The focus of the current thesis is clarification of 
concepts and I approach it by mapping peculiarities associated with knowledge intensive 
professional service start-ups in the software development industry. That means I am 
interested in analysing two cases – two certain types of companies - in the light of former 
studies, concepts and typologies of professional service firms and start-ups.  
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This study has four research questions: 
 
1. Which are the main organizational and/or managerial characteristics of an IT start-up? 
 
2. To what extent do the organizational peculiarities of IT start-ups arise from their 
knowledge intensity and to what extent from their specific start-up context?  
 
3. By which aspects are IT start-ups similar to and different from other types of professional 
service firms? 
 
4. How suitable is the existing theory and taxonomy of professional service firms to 
describing start-ups in the software development industry?  
 
Since former studies have indicated various aspects related to PSFs and start-up firms, I 
explore these two companies to find out if these aspects are relevant for the current cases. 
These findings from earlier studies are, for example, knowledge intensity, low capital 
intensity, cat herding, opaque quality, informal leadership processes, up-or-out system, lack 
of external ownership, tailor-made output, etc. I will inductively map the common 
characteristics and challenges using my studied cases, and then compare these findings with 
the existing body of knowledge, both on the PSF and start-up side.  
 
The aim of the last two questions is to analyse empirical findings in the light of the theory of 
PSFs, as well as to test some aspects of the theory on the data from software industry start-
ups. Answers to these research questions show whether IT start-ups can be seen as 
knowledge intensive professional service firms and provide a basis for clarification of the 
main concepts.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
The main limitations of this thesis are on the methodology side, as the topic is approached 
qualitatively through two case studies. This removes the possibility of covering many 
examples in the field and means generalizing the empirical findings to all of these types of 
firms. On the one hand, there are already many studies which have viewed start-ups and 
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professional service firms by describing narrow case studies, on the other hand, the 
qualitative approach is the common practice in this field. However, the generalizability issue 
is mitigated by aiming to create wide categories and codes that allow for further quantitative 
testing in the future.  
Another issue is relying largely on qualitative interviews, while a lot of relevant information 
can also be collected through observation and other research techniques. Again, this problem 
is widely spread in qualitative research, it being referred as a part of the “interview society” 
(Silverman 2004: 239). It poses a false belief that participants‟ thoughts, words and actions 
are in accordance with each other. In the current case, this issue is especially relevant in 
questioning participants about their autonomy, organizational structure and culture. These 
phenomena may have been better understood by (participant) observation in their everyday 
work. However, my general purpose was the clarification of concepts instead of getting a rich 
understanding of the details of the culture and specific exercise of power in their everyday 
working life. Aiming to get a deeper understanding of these topics would be an interesting 
research issue for future qualitative studies in the field. 
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2. Review of related literature  
 
2.1 Defining start-up firms 
 
In the specialist literature, start-ups, often also called new ventures or newly founded 
technology-based firms (NTBFs), are approached through different perspectives. First and 
most commonly start-ups are seen as merely the first stage(s) in a company development 
process. According to this, every company is at first a start-up company until it grows and 
becomes a large, complex organization.  
 
Luger and Koo (2005: 19) present this type of view. They propose an all-encompassing 
definition of start-up as a business, describing the phenomenon as something that is both new 
(“it did not exist before a given time period”); active (“it starts hiring at least one paid 
employee during the given time period”) and independent (“which is neither a subsidiary nor 
a branch of an existing firm”). However, defining the term using such a wide basis excludes 
other features that may be distinctively characteristic to start-up companies. In addition, this 
definition does not provide a clear frame to the term for two reasons. First, although the time 
factor is one of the key elements in this definition, a certain time period needed for evaluating 
a firm‟s newness is not set, which leaves this aspect open to one‟s own interpretations. 
Considering the rapid growth of many international high-tech start-ups on the one hand, and 
on the other hand the slower start-up stages of small local firms or home-based 
businesses without any paid employees, the time of a company‟s establishment may not be 
the best comparable measure. Second, defining a firm‟s activeness using at least one hired 
employee and not by its income, visible trading activities or other indicators, is not grounded 
enough in their study. Thus, in general, due to a lack of reasoning in the choice of these 
measures, I find this definition too wide to be adopted without thorough considerations. 
 
An alternative approach to start-ups focuses on start-ups being essentially different from the 
orthodox view. Ries in “The Lean Start-up” defines start-up as “(…) a human institution 
designed to deliver a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty” (Ries 
2011: 27). First, this involves the “human institution” aspect explaining that institution-
building activities like hiring, coordinating and creating a certain organizational culture 
belong to successful start-ups, and the value such a company creates lies rather in its people 
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and organization than in the product. With this last interpretation I find this approach close to 
knowledge intensive companies and knowledge workers who are seen as the core asset in 
certain types of (professional service) firms.  
 
The criteria of “newness” means that the main purpose of a start-up is to uncover a new 
source of value for its customers and at the same time the company cares about the impact of 
its work on these customers. This does not necessarily mean innovation in the product 
dimension, but the newness may be expressed in repurposing an existing technology for new 
use; unlocking value by a new business model; approaching new segments of customers; or 
doing it at a new location.  
 
One of the most important and distinguishing parts of this definition is the context in which 
start-ups operate. Different from other starting companies whose level of risk and uncertainty 
can be measured and a specific “risk premium” calculated beforehand, start-ups are seen 
operating in situations where risks are unknown. These risks do not necessarily have to be 
large in reality, but the fact that they cannot be modelled gives the start-ups a specific nature 
and challenges. By that, Ries excludes small businesses that can be financed with bank loans 
from the category of start-ups, making the definition applicable to a much smaller group of 
new businesses. However, the main benefit of such an approach lies in the essentially new 
way of thinking about start-ups.  
 
Mäkelä and Ruokolainen offer a definition of start-ups that is a little similar to the one given 
by Ries, as it too raises the issue of uncertainty in the high technology market. They note that: 
 
start-up technology companies are often research and development intensive 
companies that plan to capitalize on their knowledge after a breakthrough in the R&D 
work. Due to the volatility of the high technology market, achieving a breakthrough 
can be far from easy (Mäkelä & Ruokolainen 2007: 187).  
 
This coincides with the approach of Ries, since empirical testing (“validated learning”) is at 
the core of the lean start-up method. Nevertheless, inspired by the lean manufacturing 
philosophy originated in Japan, the lean start-up approach sets out five principles that move 
the understanding of start-ups to a different point than it has been in conventional thinking. 
These principles are as follows (Ries 2011: 8-9): 
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a) entrepreneurs are everywhere. This moves the current understanding of start-up 
entrepreneurs away from the stereotype of a youth establishing the next multi-million 
dollar company like Facebook or Google from a garage. Any entrepreneur belonging 
under the given definition of a start-up is a start-up, regardless of its size, age, sector or 
industry.  
 
It (the definition) says nothing about the size of the company, the industry, or the 
sector of the economy. Anyone who is creating a new product or business under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty is an entrepreneur whether he or she knows it or 
not and whether working in a government agency, a venture-backed company, a 
non-profit, or a decidedly for-profit company with financial investors. (…) Thus, 
when I use the term entrepreneur, I am referring to the whole startup ecosystem 
regardless of company size, sector, or stage of development (Ries 2011: 26-27, my 
own addition); 
 
b) entrepreneurship is management. This means a start-up as an institution needs a 
management designed especially for handling the extreme uncertainty of the 
environment; 
 
c) validated learning. The purpose of a start-up is seen to learn, how to build a 
sustainable business, not only to make products, provide services or earn money. 
Therefore, it is important to validate the learning scientifically, by continuous testing and 
experimenting with each element of the entrepreneur‟s vision; 
 
d) build-measure-learn. The main activity of a start-up is seen to turn ideas into products, 
measure how customers respond and then learn whether to pivot or persevere. All 
successful start-up processes should accelerate this feedback loop; 
 
e) innovation accounting. A new kind of accounting is required that helps to measure 
progress, set up milestones and prioritize work. This is necessary both to improve 
entrepreneurial outcomes and hold innovators accountable. 
 
This perspective of start-ups provided by Ries is yet new and although these thoughts have 
already well disseminated in the international start-up community, specialist literature mainly 
focuses on the issue through the classical approach first described. In the management 
literature, a lot of studies are available on how to be a successful start-up, how to launch new 
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ventures, etc. Publications in this topic have largely concerned themselves with the following 
subcategories:  
 
 internationalization, global or local nature of start-ups (e.g., Johnson 2001; Gorg & 
Strobl 2002; Fryges 2008; Andersson & Hellerstedt 2009);  
 fundraising, venture capitalists and financing (Bürgel 1999; Colombo & Grilli 2005; 
Heino 2006; Colombo & Grilli 2007; Markova & Petkovska-Mircevska 2009; Ahmed 
& Cozzarin 2009; Korosteleva & Mickiewicz 2011);  
 success factors of start-ups (Reid & Smith 2000; Feindt, Jeffcoate & Chappell 2002; 
van Gelderen, Thurik & Bosma 2005; Backes-Gellner & Werner 2007);  
 influence of start-ups to external systems/institutions and macro level (Mata 1996b; 
Fritsch 1997; Gries & Naude 2009); 
 gender issues related to start-ups (Verheul & Thurik 2001; Baron, Hannan, Hsu et al. 
2007; Coleman & Robb 2009; Verheul, Carree & Thurik 2009);  
 issues related to start-up size (Mata 1996a; Santarelli 1998; Audretsch, Santarelli & 
Vivarelli 1999; Gorg & Strobl 2002; Colombo & Grilli 2005);  
 characteristics of start-up founders (Reynolds 1997; Colombo & Delmastro 2001; 
Harada, 2003; Koellinger, Minniti & Schade 2007).  
 
As the present study focuses on the peculiarities of international start-ups researched 
empirically through case studies, I will further highlight some of the aspects that have 
previously been found when describing international start-ups.  
 
 
2.2 Characteristics of international start-ups  
 
Scholars of organization science have used multiple terms to signify the phenomenon of 
international high-technology start-up companies, calling these “international start-ups”, 
“infant multinationals”, “born globals” and “international new ventures” (Bürgel 1999). 
Oviatt and McDougall give a definition of an international new venture as a type of firm that 
“(…) from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of 
resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries” and note that “these start-ups often 
raise capital, manufacture, and sell products on several continents, particularly in advanced 
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technology industries where many established competitors are already global” (Oviatt & 
McDougall 1994: 49, 29).  
 
Thus, this approach refers to their international origin and focuses on the age of firms when 
they become international, instead of their size. In addition, according to this, being 
international does not require foreign direct investment, which means that this type of firm is 
concerned with value added, not assets owned (Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 31). A definition 
of an international start-up offered by Johnson, influenced greatly from this, sees it as “a new 
venture that exhibits an innate propensity to engage in a meaningful level of international 
business activity at or near inception, with the intent of achieving strategic competitive 
advantage” (Johnson 2001: 16). 
 
Based on existing case studies in the field, Oviatt and McDougall (1994) conclude that these 
firms are seen to form due, to a great extent, to the changed international environment. In 
other words, global forces are strongly promoting the development of international start-ups. 
Now internationally experienced and alert entrepreneurs are able to link resources from 
multiple countries to meet the demand of inherently international markets. This is a result of 
the increased speed, quality and efficiency of international transportation and communication, 
as well as homogenization of many markets in distant countries. 
 
A lot of studies have focused on finding the distinguishing features of international start-ups 
by approaching the topic both through case studies as well as quantitatively. The description 
of characteristics is wide, describing particular international new ventures and covering 
different sides of start-ups. Summarizing all these findings leads to an insight rich in smaller 
and bigger elements, although this may not necessarily mean better understanding of the 
nature of this phenomenon. Without a common theoretical framework or typology it may be 
rather confusing. To give an overview of the very different aspects associated with 
international start-ups, I will further list some scholars and their contributions to the topic.  
 
Bürgel (1999) in his doctoral thesis researched case studies of international start-ups and 
concluded that the main characteristics international start-up firms are described by the 
following:  
 
 bold and proactive moves into foreign markets; 
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 initiated international activities almost from inception; 
 entered several markets simultaneously; 
 founded by individuals with extensive international and industry experience; 
 founders had “international vision”; 
 offer standardized products and products incorporating leading-edge technology; 
 high degree of technological differentiation is met by a certain demand regardless of 
national boundaries; 
 in terms of market entry modes, a minority used arrangements requiring direct 
investment; 
 direct exporting and foreign sales via third parties being their most popular entry 
modes (Bürgel 1999: 25). 
 
Bürgel and Murray complement this list by adding some other distinguishing features based 
on quantitative studies: 
 
 preferred entry modes of technology-based start-ups are characterized by relatively 
low resource commitment;  
 their entry modes are directed toward commercialization rather than foreign 
production;  
 tendency to enter several foreign markets within a short time-span;  
 characterized by rapid and sometimes resource-intensive market entries into different 
countries;  
 some extreme cases perform different activities along their value chains in different 
countries (Bürgel & Murray 2000: 35-36). 
 
However, funding is one of the main challenges related to these companies. Many of these 
firms experience negative cash flows during their first years and to cover their initial 
expenses on development and R&D, and to finance their growth, they may be forced into 
foreign markets. The lack of necessary human and financial resources prevents them from 
successfully commercializing their products by themselves (Bürgel & Murray 2000: 36). This 
requires them to search for external financing, although the uncertainty and risks associated 
with this type of firm makes it problematic. Moore (1994) showed that among high 
technology small firms, those with the most sophisticated technologies are most likely to 
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report continual financial constraints on the development of their business. They are 
perceived more risky than small firms in general, which is usually explained by various 
factors:  
 
o these firms are usually founded by scientists who are seen to lack managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills; 
o due to novel product/service it is difficult to assess the marketplace; 
o shorter life-span of the high-tech products/services compared to conventional sectors; 
o as financing is usually required for R&D activities at the pre-product age, in case of 
these firms in addition to the general uncertainty of the market, it cannot be assured 
that the research will lead to a product within a reasonable timeframe or ever (Moore 
1994: 197). 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the named difficulties, these start-ups often operate in many 
countries on different continents and some firms effectively create subsidiaries 
simultaneously in several countries (Bürgel 1999). 
 
Johnson (2001) in his doctoral thesis, based on existing studies of international start-up 
companies, created a common international start-up profile, which characterizes the 
phenomenon in three aspects: its distinguishing features, strategies and success factors (see 
Table 1 below). This provides a detailed insight into the nature of start-ups by combining a 
good selection of previous research in this field and classifying it for a better overview. On 
the other hand, summarizing these findings in such a table does not offer a comparison of the 
extent of these features being associated with international start-ups. Some of the named 
characteristics occur with almost every international start-up (e.g., international vision that 
creates a basis for operating internationally) while other features are less commonly found 
(e.g., wide international experience of the founder(s) or top management team). However, 
this does not diminish the value of the detailed overview provided by Johnson (2001).  
 
In addition, the same study aimed to identify firm-specific success factors for small high 
technology international start-ups and to find features correlated to higher levels of 
performance. Critical success factors were found to be:  
 
 the international commitment of start-up founders; 
22 
 
 having entrepreneurial and goal driven internal organizational behaviour; 
 applying customer-driven product design; 
 having unique and innovative products; 
 engaging in continuous innovation;  
 targeting similar customer segments worldwide (Johnson 2001). 
 
In addition, his study explains the highly international nature of this type of firm by the 
international vision of the founder(s), the desire to be an international market leader, the 
identification of a specific international opportunity and the international and competitive 
nature of the firm‟s industry. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics, challenges, strategies and success factors of international start-ups, 
based on former research in the field.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Type of Organization being new venture; international at or near inception 
Size generally small 
Scope and Initial Country 
Market Selection Factors 
conducting business worldwide in large and leading industry markets 
Foreign Value Chain Activities 
and Factors Influencing Their 
Establishment 
foreign-based organizational activities to establish a local presence in 
key industry markets and to provide enhanced regional sales and service 
support 
Structure minimal internalization; utilization of alternative governance structures 
including strategic alliances and networks 
Marketplace world; geocentric mind-set; international vision 
Industry generally high technology industries, but also found in low technology 
and service industries 
Products innovation oriented; narrow product lines; international niche markets 
Competitive Advantage unique intangible asset; often unique technological knowledge or 
superior processes 
Experience extensive founder / top management team industry and international 
experience 
 
RISKS / CHALLENGES 
Risks Continuance / financial risk stemming from newness / small size / 
limited resources; political / macroeconomic / foreign exchange risk; 
alliance partner opportunism / asset expropriation; single product 
dependence 
 
STRATEGIES 
Founding Strategies instil an international vision throughout the organization; hire managers 
with extensive international experience and strong international business 
networks 
Product / Service Strategies unique, high quality products or services; innovative technology and 
product design; patent technology; superior processes; product rides on 
industry change or shift; niche within an industry in transition; product 
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differentiation; standardized product; minimal product adaptation; 
compete on quality and value; competitive process; continuous 
innovation; follow-on products; closely linked product/service 
extensions 
Distribution / Marketing 
Strategies 
target homogeneous market segments worldwide; broad market 
coverage; service of numerous customers in diverse market segments; 
develop and control multiple distribution channels; minimal marketing 
mix adaption; develop a high level of market/product visibility; 
emphasize customer satisfaction 
Entry Strategies aggressive foreign market entry; enter numerous international markets 
on a grand scale; broad and rapid market access; international co-
operative alliances; utilization of alternative / hybrid governance 
structures such as strategic alliances and networks; secure outside 
financial and production resources; first mover / early entry; early 
success in lead markets; pre-empt competition; selective international 
investments (foreign direct investment); minimal internalization; negate 
long-term dependence on alliances; focus on core competencies; 
learning experience for subsequent market entry; flexibility and rapid 
response employment; tightly networked international organization. 
 
SUCCESS FACTORS 
Founder International / global vision; foreign commitment; managerial 
experience; planning / managing markets; business / social networks 
Organization Close / tight co-ordination; strategic alliances / co-operative ventures 
Product and Marketing Strategy Quality / unique / innovative products; continuous innovation; niche 
markets; aggressive market entry; first mover. 
Source: Johnson 2001: 95, 101-102, 109, 135. 
 
One possible way to organize and systematically use these findings of different start-up 
features is offered by Oviatt and McDougall (1994) (see Figure 1 below). According to the 
relationship between the number of value chain activities co-ordinated across countries and 
the number of countries involved in the operations, they divide international new ventures 
into four types: export/import start-up (few activities in few countries), multinational 
trader (few activities in many countries), geographically focused start-up (many activities 
in few countries) and global start-up (many activities in many countries). Each of these 
types has specific organizational features, strategies and success factors. The last one, global 
start-up, is seen as the most difficult start-up to develop as both geographic and activity 
coordination is required (Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 60). “It is the most radical manifestation 
of the international new venture because it derives significant competitive advantage from 
extensive coordination among multiple organizational activities, the locations which are 
geographically unlimited” (Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 59).  
 
In contrast, multinational traders are “moving goods from nations where they are to nations 
where they are demanded” as they “serve an array of countries and are constantly scanning 
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for trading opportunities where their networks are established or where they can quickly be 
set up”. However, direct investment in any country is typically kept to a minimum (Oviatt & 
McDougall 1994: 58). Nevertheless, mixed types of these may occur and new ventures may 
change their initial type during their development.  
 
 
Figure 1. Types of International New Ventures. Source: Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 59. 
 
Although much emphasis is put on analysing the internalization strategies and stages of new 
ventures, and the validity of existing internalization and multinational enterprise theories is 
questioned, in the current thesis I will not discuss these in detail. I will continue with the 
overview of the nature of professional service firms (PSFs) and the theory of PSFs developed 
by Nordenflycht (2010). 
 
2.3 Defining professional service firms 
 
Different from the definition of start-up companies, the situation with the other main term is 
more complicated. Although as much has been written about knowledge intensive 
organizations as has been written about start-ups, no common and clear definition of this term 
has evolved. In the specialist literature several terms like “knowledge intensive firms” (KIFs), 
“knowledge-based organizations”, “knowledge creating companies”, “professional service 
firms” are in parallel usage. All of these refer to a group of professionals providing services 
to clients. Thus, it is usual to define knowledge intensive organizations through naming their 
specific properties or giving examples of this type of company. Some researchers mean that 
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consulting firms are the most typical knowledge intensive firms, while other examples of 
these can be law firms, auditor‟s offices, computer service companies, advertising agencies, 
different research laboratories, etc.  
 
The term “knowledge intensive companies” usually means companies that sell knowledge - 
their only “product” is to process and disseminate information. Their product is “non-
standardized, creative, strongly dependent of the individual and complexly problem-solving” 
(Sveiby & Risling 1987: 17). Among scholars there is consensus about the idea that 
knowledge is deeply embodied in these definitions. For example, Hill and Neely (1988) 
describe a professional service firm as one where the client is significantly dependent on the 
provider to define the problem and give appropriate advice (Lu 2005). This refers to the 
superior knowledge or expertise of a professional service firm. Wilson (1972) on the other 
hand states that professional services are: 
 
designed to improve the purchasing organization‟s performance or well-being and to 
reduce uncertainty by the application of skills derived from a formal and recognised 
body of knowledge, which may be interdisciplinary, and which provides criteria for the 
assessment of the results of the application of the service (Lu 2005: 13). 
 
Some scholars have focused on identifying the nature and different types of knowledge in 
these organizations (for example, Nonaka 2007). Other scholars have discussed about the 
principal provider of the professional services (for example, Løwendahl 2000; Despres & 
Hiltrop 1995; Lu 2005). In general, the ambiguity of the definition of professional service 
firms is seen to be coming from the ambiguity of the term professional in the former literature 
(Nordenflycht 2010). However, in this current thesis I will not describe these discussions in 
detail.  
 
In general one could look at the term “knowledge intensive company” more or less widely. 
Quite a few different typologies have been created around this term. One possibility is to 
“narrowly categorise knowledge intensive firms as professional service firms staffed by 
highly qualified experts who engage in esoteric problem solving to provide tailored services 
to corporate clients” or just suggest that all organizations are to some extent knowledge 
intensive (McGrath 1999: 3).  
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I will focus on one type of knowledge intensive organization that is a knowledge intensive 
professional service firm (PSF). It is often seen as a primary example of knowledge intensive 
companies. PSFs are found to have four principal characteristics:  
 
(1) professional services are knowledge intensive in nature;  
(2) professional services are delivered by professionals/knowledge workers; but,  
(3) professional services are nonetheless co-produced between the knowledge worker 
and the client and,  
(4) the majority of construction professional services are provided by small firms (Lu 
2005: 15). 
 
However, until the last couple of years, organization sociology has been lacking one clear 
definition of professional service firms (PSF) and this has led to several problems. Empirical 
research has often been limited as in the studies too much emphasis has put on analysis of the 
“classical” examples of PSFs with the intension to generalize the results to all kinds of PSFs. 
In addition to that,  
 
the lack of boundary conditions for the term PSF means that we cannot actually test 
existing theories about how PSFs are distinctive, since we cannot specify to which 
types of firms any proposed theory should apply. Should theories developed while 
studying law firms also apply to ad agencies, hospitals, or R&D labs? And if ad 
agencies, hospitals, or R&D labs are organized in a different fashion than law firms, 
does this mean that they are not PSFs, or does it mean that the organization of law firms 
is less paradigmatic than is often assumed? (Nordenflycht 2010: 155). 
 
Discussion about the nature of PSFs has become an actual topic in recent management and 
organization research. Andrew von Nordenflycht (2010) has created a theory and taxonomy 
of professional service firms, which is suggested by him for further empirical testing. Based 
on his overview of the cited examples of professional service firms in recent PSF-related 
literature, professional service firms are usually characterized by the following properties: 
they are human capital intensive, knowledge intensive, capital non-intensive, profession-
intensive, having a customized and intangible output, employee ownership, workforce of 
professionals, the nature of output is (expert/advisory) service rather than product, opaque 
quality is hard to evaluate, employees demand for autonomy, etc. (Nordenflycht 2007: 42). 
“Classical” examples of professional service firms named in the literature are accounting and 
law firms, as well as management consulting, engineer consulting/design, advertising 
agencies and architecture (Nordenflycht 2010: 156).  
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However, despite the confusion around this term, Nordenflycht has not offered any single 
definition for professional knowledge intensive service firms. He avoids doing that by saying: 
 
Such a dichotomous definition (PSF versus non-PSF) poses several problems. It 
excludes some fields that rank highly as examples of PSFs (...) but that are very weakly 
professionalized, such as management consulting, which would give the definition poor 
face validity. And such a restrictive definition would render PSF research ineffective in 
offering insights into managing knowledge intensity, since findings might stem from 
low capital intensity or a professionalized workforce instead (Nordenflycht 2010: 157, 
with my addition). 
 
Instead of this, Nordenflycht attempts to solve the problem of the lacking PSF definition by 
presenting a theory about the multiple sources of PSF peculiarities and their managerial and 
organizational implications. He focuses on three central phenomena - knowledge intensity, 
low capital intensity and professional workforce - and presents a taxonomy of four types of 
knowledge intensive companies, each of these associated with different types of challenges 
and organizational responses. I will give a more detailed overview of this in subchapter 2.4.  
 
Thus, a clear and single definition of professional service firms is still missing. Instead, it is 
suggested to think in terms of degrees of professional service intensity that is based on the 
presence of these three main characteristics. The study in hand is based on the mentioned 
peculiarities and taxonomy of Nordenflycht, testing their validity in the discussion chapter. 
 
2.4 Theory and taxonomy of professional service firms 
 
As noted earlier, Nordenflycht identified three distinctive features common to professional 
service firms, which are knowledge intensity, low capital intensity and professionalized 
workforce. These were chosen “because they can be well defined, they are commonly noted 
as distinctive characteristics (...), and they have been linked in the literature (...) to distinctive 
managerial challenges or organizational outcomes” (Nordenflycht 2010: 159). 
 
1) Knowledge Intensity 
 
Professional service firms are knowledge intensive as the production of their output relies on 
a substantial body of complex knowledge. In this category, only knowledge embodied in 
individuals is taken into account, while other types of knowledge like the ones situated in 
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routines, equipment and products, are left out. The reasoning behind this says that this 
approach suits well to the context of PSFs and it is coherent to the definition other scholars 
commonly have in mind while labelling PSFs as knowledge intensive. In addition, the other 
approach is seen as misleading as it widens the category too much (and may thus lead to 
difficulties in creating a limited and distinctive category). However, Nordenflycht does not 
specify the types of knowledge located in people, which form this substantial body of 
complex knowledge as noted in the definition. Being a PSF means that “the firm relies on an 
intellectually skilled workforce, not just among its executive or support functions (e.g., 
R&D), but also among its “frontline workers” (Nordenflycht 2010: 159). 
 
This peculiarity is seen to lead to two managerial challenges: cat herding and opaque quality. 
 
A) Cat herding refers to a situation where managers have difficulties retaining and 
directing employees due to their strong human capital, e.g., a complex knowledge 
essential for a company‟s successful operations. This puts the employees in a good 
bargaining position, “(…) since their skills are scarce and, in many instances, 
transferable across firms” (Nordenflycht 2010: 160). Thus, these employees are seen as 
hard to direct as highly skilled professionals often have strong preferences for 
autonomy, which is combined with their distaste for direction, supervision and formal 
organizational processes (Nordenflycht 2010: 160). 
 
Nordenflycht identifies two possible solutions to overcome this managerial challenge. 
The first one is the usage of alternative compensation mechanisms like contingent 
and/or deferred compensation (e.g., commission-based pay and performance bonuses, 
equity stakes, stock options, restricted stock grants, pensions). In other words, these are 
compensation solutions that in traditional firms are usually reserved for senior 
managers. The other solution would be to provide enough autonomy for these 
employees just as they prefer it. This could be done, for example, by greater 
decentralization of decision making and greater participation of employees in firm-level 
decisions informally in the organizational structure. The third answer to the cat herding 
challenge could be to provide more informality in organizational processes. This 
includes fewer formal rules, looser reporting routines and rotating management 
positions among senior employees (Nordenflycht 2010: 161). 
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B) Opaque quality as a managerial challenge coming from knowledge intensity is a 
situation “(…) where the quality of an expert‟s output is hard for nonexperts (i.e., 
customers) to evaluate, even after the output is produced and delivered” (Nordenflycht 
2010: 161). This happens due to lack of expertise on the customer side, which on the 
other hand is a reason why the customer has turned to the knowledge intensive 
company in the first place. Thus, this situation raises the need to signal quality. That is 
seen to be done by bonding (creating penalties for producing lousy quality, e.g., 
liability partnership where partners monitor each other; distributing profits equally 
among employee owners); developing and holding a good reputation; creating a 
trustworthy appearance (to the company‟s employees as well as to customers) and 
employing ethical codes (which is also related to professionalization). 
 
2) Low capital intensity 
 
The second main attribute that characterizes professional service firms is low capital 
intensity, i.e., “a firm‟s production does not involve significant amounts of nonhuman assets, 
such as inventory, factories and equipment, and even intangible nonhuman assets like patents 
and copyrights” (Nordenflycht 2010: 162). This peculiarity increases employee bargaining 
power and thus cat herding challenges for the management because:  
 
a) if production does not require much capital, employees‟ skills become even more 
important; 
b) employees‟ outside options increase since they can more easily start up their own 
firms; 
c) without non-human capital to specialize to, there is less likelihood of generating 
firm-specific human capital, which would reduce employee mobility (Nordenflycht 
2010: 162). 
 
On the other hand, low capital intensity is seen as reducing the need for raising investment 
funds which is considered as a positive aspect in the light of often conflicting interests of 
outside investors and inside actors of the companies.  
 
3) Professionalized workforce 
 
In this aspect, Nordenflycht bases his theory on the widely accepted main characteristics of 
the term “profession” which are a particular knowledge base (covered by the category of 
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knowledge intensity described earlier); regulation and control of that knowledge base and 
its application and ideology.  
 
The last feature, ideology, is associated both with professional codes of ethics and less 
explicit norms of behaviour for professionals. One of the main professional norms is the 
strong preference for autonomy (and because of that professionalization also amplifies the 
wish for autonomy and the managerial cat herding challenge). The other professional norm is 
called conflict of interest, altruistic service or trusteeship. This lies at the core of professional 
codes of ethics and means that professionals have a responsibility to protect the interests of 
clients/society. On the other hand, this responsibility sometimes conflicts with the economic 
interests of investors and other parties. Thus, a danger for this norm is having (commercially 
orientated) non-professionals among the owners or governance of PSFs. A solution to the 
risks coming from this is not to allow persons with only commercial interests to hold these 
positions or to organize as a non-profit organization. 
 
The main hypotheses regarding a professionalized workforce are: 
 greater professionalization of a firm’s workforce affects the intensity with which 
a firm employs alternative incentive mechanisms, both because it amplifies the cat 
herding challenge and because it mutes competition, which allows adoption of more 
alternative incentive mechanisms with less regard to any added inefficiencies; 
 greater professionalization of a firm’s workforce may decrease the level of 
commercial and/or outside ownership because of the trusteeship norm;  
 it increases the level of organizational slack as firms are able to survive without 
operating at high levels of efficiency (Nordenflycht 2010: 164). 
 
All these three peculiarities described here (knowledge intensity, low capital intensity and 
professionalized workforce) are seen to have overlapping and distinctive effects, and all of 
those increase the cat herding challenge. On the other hand, ideology and self-regulation are 
not inevitable outcomes of knowledge intensity, and the opaque quality challenge is not 
always attempted to be solved by high professionalization levels. This has led Nordenflycht 
to the need to create a typology of professional service firms, based on the existence of these 
peculiarities, challenges, opportunities and organizational responses, which I will now 
present in detail.  
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Table 2. A taxonomy and theory of knowledge-intensive firms. 
 
Source: Nordenflycht 2010: 166. 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the taxonomy of knowledge intensive firms, their characteristics 
and implications. Nordenflycht has listed four categories of firms, providing some examples 
of each of them and marked with crosses and checks the presence and predicted intensity of 
such peculiarities, challenges/opportunities and organizational responses in these categories. 
However, Nordenflycht has not clearly defined the meaning of a different number of checks 
in this context, claiming that it could mean more widespread use of a certain mechanism 
(e.g., contingent compensation offered to a broader set of the workforce), as well as greater 
magnitude of a mechanism (e.g., contingent compensation representing a larger percentage of 
total compensation) or it could imply a shift from one type of mechanism to another (e.g., 
from end-of-year bonuses to equity-based compensation) (Nordenflycht 2010: 167). He 
identifies the need for further testing in this area. 
 
As the table indicates, the first category of knowledge intensive firms is Technology 
Developers and examples of those given in the taxonomy are biotech firms and R&D labs. 
(On the other hand, an earlier work of Nordenflycht has categorized packaged software firms 
as pure knowledge firms in a different group than bio-techs and software firms belonging in 
the same subgroup with law firms (see Appendix Y and Z; Nordenflycht 2007: 43-44). In the 
current table the main examples in the Technology Developers‟ category are firms whose 
workforces are composed of engineers or scientists and that require significant investment in 
equipment or significant up-front capital to fund development of new products (Nordenflycht 
2010: 165). Technology Developers are seen as representing a combination of quite a few 
characteristics: they involve knowledge intensity, but cannot be characterized by other main 
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peculiarities in focus. These types of firms display the lowest share of professional service 
intensity, although they face the challenge of cat herding and opaque quality.  
 
The next category presented in this typology is Neo-PSFs, which is similar to the Technology 
Developers characterized by non-professionalization or weak professionalization, but has low 
capital intensity and no outside ownership/investor protections. This category is seen to 
include management consultancies and ad agencies. The label Neo-PSFs is chosen to “(…) 
capture the PSF literature‟s shift of emphasis (relative to the professions literature) from 
professionalism to knowledge intensity more broadly” (Nordenflycht 2010: 165). 
 
Classic PSFs (like law and accounting firms) are seen to have all the characteristics in the 
focus of this theory and Professional Campuses (like hospitals) differ only slightly from 
those by being more capital intensive than Classic PSFs.  
 
Thus, the theory and typology developed by Nordenflycht (2010) indicates that all PSFs share 
the characteristic named “knowledge intensity”, but they may vary based on the degree of 
capital intensity and professionalized workforce. In addition, due to different peculiarities 
associated with PSF categories, different challenges, opportunities and organizational 
responses come along with these studied peculiarities. However, the taxonomy and its 
categories are left open for further empirical testing and it is advised for future conceptual 
research to analyse additional dimensions with which to differentiate further among 
professional service firms. 
 
2.5 Critique towards the theory and taxonomy of professional service 
firms 
 
Zardkoohi, Bierman, Panina and Chakrabarty (2011) argue against several points in the 
theory and taxonomy of Nordenflycht. They believe the proper question is not how to define 
a PSF, but how a given service becomes optimally organized. Referring to many exceptions, 
even in the category of classical PSFs, they find it problematic to define PSFs in a context 
that is in constant change. Alternatively, they propose that it would be more effective to 
examine how a distinct group of firms becomes optimally organized as contexts change 
(Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 184). 
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They focus on the peculiarities, challenges and organizational responses indicated by 
Nordenflycht through the lens of context. As a result of that, they first argue that the cat-like 
behaviour of professionals depends on “(...) how easily they can be replaced by the employer 
(i.e., how competitive the labour market is for their expertise) and/or (...) whether the task 
and its contexts require an autonomous or decentralized decision-making structure” 
(Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 181). This means, in a competitive market, professionals who display 
cat-like behaviour can easily lose their job, but on the other hand, the firm can replace such 
employees without any difficulties. In addition, transferability of human capital makes it 
possible for the companies to employ from competitors. For employees there is a limit to job 
switching, because of their reputation for such cat-like behaviour and even if the job 
switching succeeds, it will result in an employee‟s own over time work. Thus, contrary to 
Nordenflycht‟s point, Zardkoohi et al. do not see cat herding problems arising due to 
complex knowledge, but lack of competition in the job market. In addition, the scholars 
do not believe in such retaining difficulties of professionals as indicated by Nordenflycht 
(Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 181, 183).  
 
For the third, Zardkoohi et al. tie the decentralized decision making and autonomy at 
work to the aspect of context. Different from Nordenflycht who explains these as 
organizational responses to professionals who strongly prefer autonomy and who are thus 
provided with this kind of incentive for retaining reasons, Zardkoohi et al. find this rather as 
an “(…) efficient organizational response to the decentralized nature of information held by 
professionals” (Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 181). Thus, they make a distinction between the terms 
of cat herding and independence. Referring to university professors in the lecture theatre, 
lawyers in the courtroom and surgeons in the operating room - all of them are led by their 
own initiative with no regard for administrative superiors. 
 
For the fourth, Zardkoohi et al. argue against “unlimited liability partnership” as an 
effective method to address the challenge of opaque quality. They indicate that in the U.S. 
and Europe most traditional PSFs are organized as limited liability partnerships in order to 
prevent cross-liabilities when faced with lawsuits and not to signal quality. Due to the large 
size of many companies in this category, assuming liability by each partner is too costly and 
impractical due to often great geographical diversification. It would create an unnecessary 
risk for each partner. An additional factor influencing effective monitoring is the free-rider 
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problem which comes from the fact that if one puts effort into monitoring other partners‟ 
work, she has to bear the costs arising from this, but the benefits of her behaviour will also 
spread to every other partner in the company (Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 181-182).  
 
Further, different from Nordenflycht‟s argument, who sees contingent and deferred 
compensation systems as one solution to the cat herding challenge, Zardkoohi et al. find it 
instead coming from high monitoring costs. “(...) high monitoring costs are the main 
explanation for the adoption of such compensation systems, where each partner‟s 
compensation is contingent on his or her performance only” (Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 182). 
Hence, again the context is seen as playing a crucial role in this aspect. 
 
Zardkoohi et al. also disagree with Nordenflycht in two aspects related to the low capital 
intensity. Nordenflycht states that low capital intensity further amplifies the challenge of 
retaining professionals and the cat herding problem. Nordenflycht further claims that “low 
capital intensity gives the firm the opportunity to avoid outside investors as monitors so that 
the firm has the freedom to adopt efficient measures of alternative compensation, employee 
autonomy, and informality” (Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 183). In addition, he refers to conflicting 
interests of outside investors and professionals in the company, finding that keeping 
commercially oriented actors away from firm ownership or governance minimizes possible 
risks to the trusteeship norm. Zardkoohi et al. argue against these statements. First, they find 
the fear of losing professionals irrelevant in the context where competition allows 
replacing professionals who act like independent cats. Second, corporate governance 
literature does not support the idea of outside investors objecting effectively working 
organizational measures. On the contrary, scholars refer to the evidence of law firms (as the 
classical example of PSFs) that have turned into “corporate form” with stocks traded on the 
open market (Zardkoohi et al. 2011: 181-183). 
 
Hence, the context-based view of the theory explained in this section provides a somewhat 
different yet valuable understanding of the possible reasons behind the peculiarities of PSFs. 
However, the typology and three core peculiarities of PSFs have not been contested.  
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2.6 Support from other scholars on peculiarities associated with 
professional service firms 
 
Former literature on professional service firms and knowledge intensive companies has 
approached the described peculiarities a bit differently from Nordenflycht and pointed out 
some other peculiarities of these types of companies that are not reflected in the theory 
developed by Nordenflycht (2010). I will now give a short overview of a selection of these, 
however, I begin by naming the three characteristics that were intentionally excluded from 
the theory and typology by Nordenflycht. These are: 
 
1. “intangible output” that is often used to characterize PSFs, but the term is seen as 
too hard to pin down or not very useful;  
2. “customized output” as applying the expertise to each client‟s special situation. 
However, this term has nothing new to offer that is not covered by the term 
knowledge intensity; 
3. “serving of business clients” rather than individuals is characteristic, but is not 
clearly tied to distinct organizational outcomes (Nordenflycht 2010: 165). 
 
Some other formerly mentioned peculiarities, challenges and opportunities of PSFs fall into 
the same categories as the ones created by Nordenflycht, thus supporting his analysis. These 
are: 
 
1. “knowledge intensity“. Starbuck (1992) advises to weight company‟s emphasis on 
esoteric expertise instead of widely shared knowledge, in order to find out if the 
company is a knowledge intensive company (Starbuck 1992: 716). He claims that 
exceptional and valuable expertise must dominate commonplace knowledge and this 
type of expertise has to make an important contribution to the company, so that the 
firm could be categorized as knowledge intensive. Seen from the other side, 
knowledge is different from a flow of information and should not be confused with 
this. One possibility to identify knowledge workers is to set criteria of formal 
education and expertise equivalent to a PhD, and to identify knowledge intensive 
firms as ones where such experts constitute at least one third of the workforce; 
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“distinctive competencies and reflecting the context”. Related to the knowledge 
intensity, Starbuck has noted that competitive edge of very successful firms comes 
from their exploitation of peculiarities.  
 
A modal firm in a competitive industry makes low profits, and it does not 
survive long. High profits and long survival come from monopolistic 
competition. Monopolistic competition arises from firms‟ developing 
distinctive competencies and mirroring their environments‟ unusual needs and 
capabilities (Starbuck 1992: 721); 
 
2. “cat herding challenge“. Knowledge workers are seen as distinguishable from 
manual workers by carrying the means of production in themselves in the form of 
knowledge and thus they are able to move, working one place to another, taking the 
knowledge with them. Their skills are considered not “transaction-specific” and they 
themselves “are unlikely to suffer productivity losses when they move to another 
organization” (Groysberg & Lee 2008: 1123-1124). In addition, due to their tight 
contact with customers who tend to be loyal to the knowledge workers, another risk 
for the company is that in the case of leaving, customers will move with the 
knowledge worker (Groysberg & Lee 2008: 1123-1124); 
 
“recruitment and retention issues”. These are considered complicated as the 
compensation packages are already very high in the case of knowledge workers; these 
employees are seen as highly intrinsically motivated and the job market for top 
experts is wide and increasing. Traditional governance structures do not sit well with 
profession‟s ethical and normative codes and the pursuit of economic profit; in 
addition, knowledge workers are not willing to give away their autonomy. “PSFs also 
have unique challenges because of their core concern with knowledge and expertise 
and the nature of their relationships with clients” (Suddaby 2008: 990);  
 
“value of extraordinary performers for the company”. In knowledge intensive 
companies, the productivity and thus value of top performers exceeds many times 
their colleagues, and therefore they cannot be replaced by a large number of poorer 
performers or non-human assets. On the other hand, these workers are remarkably 
more visible in the labour market than others and they gain disproportionally more 
attention from competitors, clients and media. This attention is complemented by their 
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higher mobility and therefore, desirability to competitors (Groysberg and Lee, 2008: 
1125-1126); 
 
3. “opaque quality”. Starbuck refers to the non-controllable quality of expert work by 
its clients. He explains that clients cannot judge expert advice or reports only on 
substance; they do not know what would have happened if they had not followed the 
advice given to them or they may not understand what the experts are saying. 
Therefore, experts‟ ways of speaking, usage of impressive statistical computations, 
their appearance, data quality, logic in their analyses, self-confidence etc. are then 
crucial signals of quality (Starbuck 1992: 731). 
 
4. “informal leadership“. Knowledge intensive firms are seen as downplaying formal 
structures and hierarchies, replacing their roles with social norms and incentives. A 
reason behind this is considered to be the wish for autonomy of knowledge workers; 
another reason is considered to be these workers‟ many years in formal (higher) 
education and the values that have come from this. In addition, experts work 
independently because their projects involve just a few people. Knowledge intensive 
firms need fluidity and ambiguity in order to respond to the market situation, and 
therefore, matrix structures and sketchy organization charts are common (Starbuck 
1992: 730). 
 
 
Thus, several scholars have described earlier the characteristics and challenges of PSFs 
chosen by Nordenflycht in his theory. However, in some aspects their approach has been 
slightly different, hence providing an addition to the theoretical background of this thesis. 
Further, I will continue by giving an overview of the methodology and empirical findings of 
the study in hand, and return to these issues described in this chapter in the discussion. 
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3. Design and methodology 
 
In the following section I give an overview of the design and methodological issues related to 
the study in hand. First, I reflect upon the overall approach of my research project and the 
rationale behind it. Further, I explain in detail the selection of cases and informants, and data 
gathering and analysis methods. This section ends with quality issues: trustworthiness, 
personal biography influencing interpretations of this study and ethical reflections. 
  
3.1 Overall approach and rationale 
 
In the present study I have chosen to approach the thematics qualitatively. I find the term 
“qualitative research” is best defined by Denzin and Lincoln who claim that:  
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These 
practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, 
including fieldnotes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos 
to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them (Creswell 2006: 36). 
 
It is suggested to consider using qualitative methods among other reasons when an issue or 
problem needs to be explored; we need a complex, detailed understanding of the 
issue; to understand the contexts or settings in which the participants address a problem or 
issue; develop theories when partial or inadequate theories exist and so on (Creswell 2006: 
39-41). 
 
This decision to approach the thematics qualitatively is grounded in my research objective. In 
order to get a relevant, naturalistic understanding about a certain type of organization, 
qualitative methods are a good choice. My aim is to gain insight from the actors in IT start-up 
companies - a field that is not covered by earlier studies. It is essential to hear the voices of 
the actors to see the rationale behind their actions and understand their values and 
organizational culture that is different from other, more traditional, companies. In addition, 
only partial theories exist about software development companies (not start-ups) as 
professional service firms and therefore, a complex exploration of these organizations 
39 
 
through qualitative methods is needed. Mapping the peculiarities of these firms based on the 
small amount of existing literature would also be possible using the quantitative approach, 
though this would only fasten these companies to a certain narrow category in the existing 
typology without trying to get the whole picture and adapting the theory to their actual 
characteristics. It would be an easy way out, but certainly not the best decision in the case of 
this research aim. 
 
However, the qualitative paradigm can be used in different ways and it is therefore important 
to decide whether or not to use a specific qualitative approach (e.g., phenomenology, 
narrative research, grounded theory etc.). I have chosen to investigate the topic through the 
case study approach.  
 
Case study research is defined as involving “the study of an issue explored through one or 
more cases within a bounded system” or more specifically as:  
 
a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (…) or 
multiple bounded systems (…) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information (…), and reports a case description and 
case-based themes (Creswell 2006: 73).  
 
Some researchers think of the case study as merely a choice of what is to be studied, others 
look at it more widely and stress that a case study is not a method, but a research strategy that 
should be defined in terms of its theoretical orientation. Emphasis is put on understanding 
processes in, and with, their contexts and it is thus essential for a case study researcher to 
develop plausible theoretical frameworks that provide both sense of the particular 
circumstances in focus and of more general aspects of interest and relevance (Cassell & 
Symon 2004: 326). By using an open and flexible approach in the interviews, I wanted to 
understand the nature of my studied companies and their everyday processes within their 
context. This influencing context could be either the specific start-up context, IT sector, PSF-
context or for some issues the organizational context itself as well. For doing this, I looked at 
the empirical findings through the existing body of knowledge about PSFs and start-ups.  
 
My choice in favour of case study research is in accordance with former organizational 
studies. It also gives the possibility to study a small number of cases in detail, by employing 
different data sources and methods - whatever is valuable to develop as good an 
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understanding of the case as possible (Silverman 2004 :126). Viewed more narrowly, I use 
the collective case study approach, by selecting one issue and analysing two case studies in 
the light of this topic. In my case this is clarification of concepts done by analysing chosen 
cases in the light of the former body of knowledge in this field.  
 
I have decided to focus relatively straightforwardly on the topics of this study. It could be 
labelled as a rather functionalist perspective, being less related with the sides of 
interpretivism and constructivism. However, this does not mean that I am trying to avoid 
possible patterns hidden in the data and to see everything only “as it is”. The idea is to take 
the actor‟s point of view and thus both to look at the processes through the eyes of 
participants and then to develop these views into greater categories and abstracts. “At some 
point we ask, “Did we get the story “right”?”, knowing that there are no “right” stories, only 
multiple stories” (Creswell 2006: 44). When approaching the research focus qualitatively, 
this was one of the main beliefs I held in my mind.  
 
3.2 Selection of the cases and informants 
 
Further on I will explain reasoning behind the selection of cases and participants. 
As Becker describes it:  
 
sampling is a major problem for any kind of research. We can‟t study every case of 
whatever we‟re interested in, nor should we want to. Every scientific enterprise tries 
to find out something that will apply to everything of a certain kind by studying a few 
examples, the results of the study being, as we say “generalizable” to all members of 
that class of stuff. We need the sample to persuade people that we know something 
about the whole class (Becker 1998: 67). 
 
In this study I have chosen to take a look at the research objectives through two cases. This 
decision has been a compromise between generalizability, possible depth of the data and the 
capacity of this project in terms of time and other resources. “The study of more than one 
case dilutes the overall analysis; the more cases an individual studies, the less the depth in 
any single case” (Creswell 2006: 76). Therefore, it is important to take a look at the sampling 
issue as something that is grounded in the theory and thus purposive. “The issue should be 
couched in terms of the generalizability of cases to theoretical propositions rather than to 
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populations or universes” (Silverman 2004: 130). In the current study I have tried to search 
for organizations where the issues I aim to study are most likely to occur.  
 
Boundaries for my cases are set by the field of activity (the software development industry), 
age (legal age not older than 10 years), number of employees (more than five but less than 
100 persons) and the fact that in the public sphere they were cited as examples of start-up 
companies. I planned to study successful start-ups that have gone through the very first stages 
of development, have stable income and employ a few more workers than the initial founders. 
I am aware that it is not necessary to study only successful examples of one phenomenon to 
get a full understanding of it, rather the opposite, and I was considering involving a start-up 
company that has failed in this industry. This may have given a different insight into the 
challenges faced by these types of companies, however, this would have increased the focus 
of my thesis outside the planned boundaries and therefore, this extension would suit better in 
another research project. In addition to this expansion it would be interesting, although 
outside of my present limits, for a larger project to take account the macro level (country, 
society, global environment) and the peculiarities and challenges influencing IT start-ups 
from this view point; also the theoretical background of informationalism and other related 
concepts. In that case it would be necessary to interview the representatives of national start-
up programmes, umbrella organizations of start-ups and other actors in this field, however, 
this is an aspect I have put aside on purpose. 
 
It is advised to be flexible towards research focus and be prepared to change it when needed:  
 
Each stage of the research work will result in challenging a project‟s focus and lead to 
some re-evaluation (....) Too strong a focus early on may lead to you ignoring what 
actually are more important issues than the ones you have chosen. Too weak a focus 
results in following up each side issue as it emerges and not getting anywhere! 
(Silverman 2004: 91)  
 
This was the actual case for my project as well. At first the purpose of this study was to 
research software development companies as professional service firms, as categorized in 
Nordenflycht‟s model (2010). After the first interviews in my first case, I realized the topic 
should be better defined, as this case seemed to have some peculiarities and challenges due to 
its specific start-up nature. This made me to change my focus, explore the literature about 
start-up companies and find the second case that would suit this extra criterion.  
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I approached the first case through my personal network, as a family member of mine had co-
operated with an owner of an IT start-up company. I used e-mail to introduce myself, my 
research project and the practical information related to this, and to invite his company to 
participate in this study. E-mail was chosen as it allows giving more information at once than 
a phone call which I consider more suitable for urgent issues. It does not require quick and 
short answers, rather provides a bit more time to think it through and come back to the issue 
later. In addition, many of the organizations in this industry are physically spread around the 
world (also in different time zones), which makes it more difficult to get in touch with them 
by other means.  
 
My first contact took some days to answer and then asked for exact information about the 
time needed from him. After this he quickly agreed to take part in this research. However, 
although it seemed logical to get in touch with the possible case companies via e-mail and I 
beforehand thought this medium is very commonly used in the information technology 
industry, after some first experiences I realized that some challenges relate to this. In the 
search for the next possible cases, I experienced that quite often no response followed either 
my invitation by e-mail or the second reminder using the same medium. I then contacted one 
possible interviewee through on-line chat conversation on Skype as he lived on another 
continent and heard that he had not even read the information I had sent. He explained this by 
saying he receives more than 400 e-mails per day and thus has no time to read everything. 
Another possible interviewee did answer my appeal, but noted that I should not write such a 
long e-mail as he has no time to read this.  
 
This was an interesting discovery for me, since I had written only the pure basics needed in 
order to get the informed consent. I assume this reflects a different e-mail culture among the 
field specialists compared to persons working in other industries. E-mails are not much read 
or done so very quickly and the focus of communication has moved to some other mediums 
(e.g., Skype chat or calls). A reason behind this may be the nature of start-up companies that 
require (especially at the beginning) high workloads from its founders, since on the one hand 
a team of a few is supposed to cover all important tasks in the organization and on the other, 
huge progress in terms of cash flow and other essential measures is expected. Therefore, to 
secure easier access to the field, for future research projects I would suggest approaching this 
sector, at least in addition to e-mails, by some other mediums as well.  
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Altogether I turned to seven IT companies from which two agreed to participate in the study; 
one explained their refusal with organizational restructuring, uncertainty and high stress 
levels among employees; one already had some students with their on-going research projects 
in the company; one refused due to lack of time; one did not answer to my appeals for more 
than half a month and then wrote that he is not the right person in the company to decide that 
kind of matter and from one company I never heard anything. After getting quite a few 
refusals and being under some time pressure myself, I decided to change my tactics a little. I 
decided to focus on start-ups instead of all software development firms. As the start-up 
community in Estonia is rather small and nearly everyone knows everyone, I asked for 
referrals from the founder of my first case. He kindly gave me a short list of the most 
successful start-up companies I could use in this project. This time I started my invitation e-
mail with his referral and this tactics worked - the company agreed to co-operate with me. 
Thus, I am of the opinion that this may be a good way to contact possible cases in other 
closed communities as well.  
 
As the research purpose assumes a wider understanding of the particular company, its 
challenges, issues related to leadership, job market, investor relationships etc., keeping the 
focus on insights from managers and founders is therefore important. On the other hand, it is 
necessary to hear the voices of “knowledge workers” as well, as they are situated at the core 
of knowledge intensive firms and thus, also in my study. A second opinion, a reflection of the 
issues raised and characterized by managers/founders is needed. In the study in hand I 
conducted interviews with company managers/founders and “key persons” from the 
knowledge workers that were mentioned during the interviews with managers/owners as 
extra valuable persons for the firm or those with long-term experience in the company. This 
seems to be a slightly subjective evaluation and raises the question of whether managers may 
have referred those employees as persons who would give me the information the managers 
would like them to give. However, as both of the companies employed fewer than 50 persons, 
the choice is not that wide and is even more narrowed by the different positions and working 
experience, so that it was quite clear to me why certain persons were recommended. In 
addition, I could myself choose the employees I would like to talk to; the final decision on 
possible interviewees was made by me. I decided to leave out those persons who do not work 
in knowledge intensive positions (e.g., customer service providers). Furthermore, not all 
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possible interviewees agreed to participate in the study (two of them ignored my invitations), 
which decreased even more the influence of managers on the data collected from employees.  
 
In the current study I conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants from each 
firm. I intended to interview company founders, CEOs and a sample of knowledge workers 
(software developers, designers etc.). In total I had nine interviews. In Fraktal/Edicy I ended 
up with five interviews: three interviews with the company‟s founders and at the same time 
knowledge workers, and two interviews with pure knowledge workers. In ZeroTurnaround I 
conducted four interviews: one with the company‟s founder and CEO, one with the founder 
and knowledge worker, and two with pure knowledge workers. The interviews lasted from 40 
minutes to two hours.  
 
One reason behind the number of interviews was the objective of the current thesis which is 
clarification of concepts. Critical testing and supplementing of the existing definition and 
typology of PSFs is important for several reasons. It develops the general body of knowledge 
about professional service firms; forms a basis for future research on PSFs by clarifying the 
borders of this phenomenon and tries to solve the generalizability issue and helps to move 
forward to a definition that covers all main aspects of PSFs or in finding an alternative to this. 
On the other hand, clarification of concepts contributes to the knowledge about start-ups. It 
shows to what extent the characteristics commonly related to PSFs exist in this kind of 
company and creates a basis for integrating this PSF-related side into the research and 
analysis of start-ups in the future. Thus, the clarification is important for both schools of 
thought. According to the categorization of the case studies, my study could be characterized 
as an instrumental case study, “in which a case is examined mainly to provide insight into an 
issue or to revise a generalization. Although the case selected is studied in depth, the main 
focus is on something else” (Silverman 2004: 127). Comparative case study gives a sufficient 
overview of the main characteristics by these concepts, gives the opportunity to find the 
aspects that are common by both cases and allows comparing these findings with formerly 
indicated peculiarities. It allows forming a model to categorize peculiarities and challenges 
that are tied to these firms, which helps to clarify the nature of these concepts, without the 
aim to cover all aspects and map even the smallest details of the cases. Thus, much of the 
purpose of the chosen research methodology (comparative case study), methods and the 
thesis in its entirety is such a clarification. 
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Another reason behind the number of conducted interviews was the small size and recent or 
on-going fast growth of these companies. Edicy started its quick growth at the beginning of 
2012, but during the interviewing period it employed 4-6 persons working on the Edicy side. 
One of them did not want to participate in the study. ZeroTurnaround employed 
approximately 50 persons by the beginning of the interviewing period, but most of them had 
not had a long history within the firm. Since 2011 the company has significantly grown every 
quarter (first from 9 to 18 employees, then to 35 to 47, until the end of research period to 59 
employees). An important percentage of its workforce is sales persons, administrative 
employees, managers and others not applicable for my interviews. From its 59 employees, 21 
are engineers and 38 other occupations. Both of these aspects limit the number of possible 
interviews. However, the reasoning behind the number of interviews was to keep conducting 
interviews as long as no significant new information occurs (data saturation point) and this 
principle was fully complied with. Together with the secondary data I obtained a versatile 
understanding of the main issues through these cases. 
 
3.3 Data-gathering methods 
 
Data was gathered in two ways: through qualitative interviews and secondary data available 
in the public sphere. It might have been possible to find answers to the research questions 
through observation and analysis of documentary, as interviews in general are essential when 
wanting to get and understand the insight of actors in the field. However, the chosen methods 
have given me a very good insight of the thematics. 
 
3.3.1 Secondary data 
 
The importance of collecting prior knowledge is emphasized by the scholars, because it has a 
tendency to become a part of researcher‟s subjectivity. Therefore, it should be treated 
critically.  
 
Reviewing literature before entering the field is critical. It gives you prior knowledge 
(….) The more one knows about what is known about the part of world being 
explored, the better. Little may be known or understood without that. The knowledge 
gained in the review becomes part of one‟s subjectivity and should, like all 
knowledge, be treated critically (Graue & Walch 1998: 92).  
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Before conducting interviews I did some desk research about the particular company by using 
media publications, company homepages, weblogs, financial reports, Facebook pages, video 
interviews, etc. In addition I asked the company CEO or contact person to send me all kinds 
of information about the firm that could provide me with a good understanding of it, and by 
this, save their valuable time during the interviews. Where it was possible, I tried the main 
product of the companies to understand the different features of it. I coded and categorized 
the collected secondary data and drew a flow chart of this information. Secondary data 
formed the first understanding of peculiarities and challenges related to these companies. 
 
3.3.2 Interviews 
 
“The purpose of a qualitative research interview (...) (is) obtaining qualitative descriptions of 
the life world of the subject with respect to interpretation of their meaning” (Kvale 1996: 124, 
my addition). Qualitative semi-structured interview is characterized by having some 
suggested questions and aims to have a sequence of themes to be covered, although at the 
same time the researcher remains open to changes of sequence and forms of questions, 
intending to follow up the answers and stories told by the subjects (Kvale 1996: 124). 
 
Kvale also describes the various dimensions that characterize interviews, these are interview 
structure; openness of purpose; emphasis on exploration versus hypothesis testing; 
description versus interpretation and intellectual-emotional dimension (Kvale 1996: 126-
127). According to the first dimension - interview structure – the conducted interviews were 
quite open as specific themes were in focus, but I did not hold a predetermined sequence and 
formulation of questions. I tried to use a lot of follow-ups and other probing techniques in 
order to have a natural, conversation-like interview that would be interesting for the 
interviewees as well, especially as they expressed being under significant time pressure, but 
nevertheless agreed to give me the interview. In addition, as I did not do observations in the 
companies, this open structure enabled getting the closest picture of “how things work” in the 
case company; whereas using a tight structure would have been too artificial. To be able to 
probe successfully, I drew mindmaps based on the obtained information on paper while 
interviewing - this helped me with keeping an eye on the logic during the interview, covering 
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every aspect I was planning to and at the same time writing down the aspects I wanted to get 
to know more about.  
 
With regard to openness of purpose, I chose to adopt a roundabout approach with rather 
indirect questions for the same reason as for using an open interview structure. This provided 
more inductiveness and a wider picture of the company than I would have obtained by setting 
strict boundaries. In the scale of exploration versus hypothesis testing I would place myself in 
the middle, aiming to explore the topics inductively, but at the same time holding in my mind 
some hypotheses coming from prior knowledge about these companies and the specialist 
literature. However, concerning the dimension of description versus interpretation, I tried to 
mainly get detailed descriptions of the investigated phenomena, with rather less emphasis on 
interpreting these together with the subject. This decision came purely from the angle of my 
research questions. On the scale of intellectuality-emotionality, my conducted interviews 
could be characterized as rather rational logical discourses where I, together with the subject, 
tried to analytically clarify the phenomena in focus.  
 
Prior to first interviews with my subjects I pre-tested my interview guide on a family member 
who is a CEO of a professional service firm in another industry. Doing this gave me the first 
impression of the interviews, made me correct some questions that did not sound good and let 
me evaluate the approximate time spent on each thematic group of questions. I conducted 
interviews with participants using Skype video call. That means, although we were located 
physically in different countries, I could see and hear the interviewees in real time and vice 
versa. Skype was chosen because it is one of the main communication tools used by such IT 
firms which my informants were very used to. In addition, it was chosen because of my 
residence abroad during the field work period. Since time pressure was often mentioned by 
the CEOs and some knowledge workers, video call enabled me to save their valuable time 
because there was no need to make appointments to meet requiring being at a certain time in 
a common place. My interviewees could start a video call independently from their physical 
location - one of them was at home, another in their office or at other places indoors. The 
advantages of Skype over other communication tools are the wide awareness of it among 
Estonians, good accessibility and globally free calling. This is an actual advantage for 
companies situated across the world. On the other hand, by conducting interviews via Skype, 
I did not have a chance to walk around their companies and observe, which may have given 
me some kind of extra information about the cases (e.g., what kind of routines they have, how 
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do they communicate with each other, how is leadership conducted and perceived by 
employees, etc.). However, since their offices are around the world, including on other 
continents, I would not have been able to observe the working life in each company anyway. 
In the current situation, nevertheless, it was a good solution for getting a natural insight into 
my participants‟ working life, as every informant could stay in their safe and familiar 
environment while talking about the same environment. During the interviews, some 
participants showed me around the office through the camera, so that I could perceive their 
working environment without actually disturbing them.  
 
I did not perceive any discouraging factors coming from interviews being conducted via 
Skype apart from the fact that it was not as easy to interrupt the other party while talking as it 
is in a face-to-face situation. Interruption would have taken place with a short delay so that it 
would break the normal conversation unexpectedly, as otherwise one usually waits for a short 
pause to ask a new question. In a case like that I usually let the person finish his reasoning. In 
general, after a short briefing, I started interviewing by asking some wider, introductory 
questions about the company and their tasks in it. Sometimes I had to ask questions when I 
believed I already knew the answer and the answers often surprised me. This taught me to 
assume nothing and to always ask the questions needed to understand the point of view of my 
informants. 
 
I audio recorded all interviews so that I could listen to these afterwards, transcribe and begin 
data analysis.  
 
3.4 Data analysis procedures 
 
Data analysis begun with transcription; approximately 85% of the interviews were 
transcribed. I decided not to transcribe all the data I collected as my research purpose was not 
to reveal any hidden meanings behind what was said or in general to take an interpretivist 
perspective. Further, I applied a coding process that works from the data to a larger 
theoretical model. I continued the work with thematic analysis by coding sentences/ideas 
from the interviews and then grouping them into categories. “Through its theoretical freedom, 
thematic analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a 
rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (Braun & Clarke 2006: 78). This method 
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suited my purposes well. I followed the advice from Creswell who notes that “qualitative 
researchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the “bottom-up”, by organizing 
the data into increasingly more abstract units of information” (Creswell 2006: 38). Therefore, 
in the analysis I tried to remove myself from the former (desk) research findings and 
typologies, and to be as inductive as possible. However, some prior knowledge about the 
PSFs learned from literature influenced the analysis to some extent. Nevertheless, I did not 
code the interviews by research questions created before looking at the data, but instead, as 
the definition of inductive approach assumes, the exact research questions emerged from the 
data during the coding process (Braun & Clarke 2006). I used a realistic epistemological 
point of view, assuming a simple one-way relationship between the language, experiences 
and meanings of utterances. Therefore, I created categories on the semantic level by defining 
their meanings rather concretely and superficially. 
 
Miles and Huberman find that instead of using text, conceptual frameworks are best done 
graphically, as it is beneficial for the analysis to have the whole framework on a single page 
(Silverman 2004: 86). To get a good overview and understanding of the data, categories 
emerging from it and the relations between these, I created a flow chart. I attempted to 
develop a complex picture of the issue under study, by holding onto pieces of information 
that at first glance were not direct answers to my research questions; instead I put these aside 
and came back to these later on, to see how they fitted in to the overall picture. I aimed to 
employ the “rigorous approach” which means that: 
 
(...) extensive data collection in the field occurs, or when the researcher conducts 
multiple levels of data analysis, from the narrow codes or themes to broader 
interrelated themes to more abstract dimensions. Rigor means, too, that the researcher 
validates the accuracy of the account using one or more of the procedures for 
validation, such as member checking, triangulating sources of data, or using peer or 
external auditors of the accounts (Creswell 2006: 46). 
 
For validation I used the help of some of my interviewees. I present a more detailed 
description of validation and its related issues in the next subchapter.  
 
I conducted data analysis at the same time as gathering data, which means I transcribed and 
did the initial coding of the material right after each interview. This led to a situation where 
each interview was at least partly influenced by the former ones and in the upcoming 
interviews I could ask specific questions about the areas where I did not gain a full 
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understanding. Although this approach is widely common in grounded theory studies, I found 
it helpful in my case studies as well.  
 
3.5 Trustworthiness 
 
This section examines the validation and reliability of the results from my case studies. 
 
By validity, I mean truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers (…) Reliability refers to the degree 
of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different 
observers or by the same observer on different occasions. (Silverman 2004: 210) 
 
I will first focus on the most often used means of validation, which are construct validity, 
external validity and internal validity, and then describe other methods employed for ensuring 
research quality and reliability. By construct validity it is meant “the establishment of correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied”; by external validity “the possibility of 
extrapolating the results obtained from a sample to other elements, under different conditions 
of time and place” and by internal validity “ensuring the relevance and internal coherence of 
the results in line with the researcher‟s stated objectives” (Lu 2005: 92).  
 
For ensuring construct validity I have collected data from multiple sources. I interviewed 
company founders and CEOs to get a broader picture of the organization and its history, and 
knowledge workers such as engineers, designers and programmers to get an understanding of 
their role, motivation and perception of the everyday working life in the organization. This 
gave me a two-sided view of the case. In addition, I put much effort into collecting and 
analysing the secondary data available in the public sphere, so this widened my knowledge 
about the studied companies and general industrial/start-up peculiarities.  
 
To ensure external validity I employed an explicit research design by explaining the 
sampling strategy, data analysis procedures and providing an interview guide. This allows 
other researchers to conduct a study using the same methods and principles as I did, to either 
confirm or challenge my findings. For ensuring internal validity I was flexible in my 
research objectives during the study. As I approached the topic inductively during the 
interviews and coding processes, I was free to any change the direction of the whole thesis. 
This means that my exact research questions and findings evolved together, being interrelated 
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and influenced by each other.  
 
In general, an important prerequisite for validity is treating all data that has been collected. I 
decided to approach my data inductively and then to categorize every aspect that occurred 
through data collection. This means also coding those data where at first I could not see a 
direct relation to my research aims or former findings in the field. The meaning and role of 
these codes became clear later in the analysis. Some examples of this are the codes like 
“physical working environment” and “plurality of roles of key workers”.  
 
To ensure that I had understood and communicated the main issues related to the studied 
cases in the same way that they had come from the companies, I used respondent validation. 
I went back to some of my subjects with the initial findings and asked for their feedback. In 
one case it worked fine, I got the extra information that I asked for and comments about my 
empirical findings. In the other case I did not receive feedback. As a result of that, only 
findings about one company were reviewed and specified. I decided to send the material for 
validation to the companies‟ founders and CEOs as they are the main representatives of the 
company with the widest understanding of the firm, and also most responsible for securing a 
proper image of the firm. However, in the case of ZeroTurnaround the validation took place 
via another person who is responsible for communication in the company. I see this as a 
benefit because she organized the needed feedback in the given timeframe, something that 
would have been much less likely due to the tight schedule of the company‟s CEO.  
 
However, respondent validation is not the sole or best choice for increasing thesis validity. As 
Fielding and Fielding argue:  
 
there is no reason to assume that members have privileged status as commentators on 
their actions (...) such feedback cannot be taken as direct validation or refutation of 
the observer‟s inferences. Rather such processes of so-called “validation” should be 
treated as yet another source of data and insight (Silverman 2004: 212).  
 
This is partly why I asked for only the empirical findings section and case description to be 
reviewed, not the discussion chapter. In reviewing the empirical findings chapter, only the 
facts need to be corrected (e.g., the working time requirement in the company which was a 
specified aspect in the review) and it does not require prior theoretical knowledge. In 
addition, valid empirical findings form a basis for the analytical discussion. 
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Another source for validity is applying the refutability principle which means that “we must 
overcome the temptation to jump to easy conclusions just because there is some evidence that 
seems to lead in an interesting direction. Instead, we must subject this evidence to every 
possible test” (Silverman 2004: 213). This principle can be well upheld by deploying the 
constant comparative method and “(…) inspecting and comparing all the data fragments that 
arise in a single case” (Silverman 2004: 214).  
 
In my thesis I employed an approach that is usually characteristic in grounded theory – I 
transcribed, coded and analysed my data right after each interview. I tested my findings from 
one interview in the next one, to be sure that these findings belong to a common pattern and 
are not just a deviation from the others. In addition, I constantly tested my research questions. 
At one stage I doubted if my studied cases represent professional service firms as in both of 
them the participants talked about their products and not services. To test the suitability of my 
cases with my research questions, I compared the material collected from media, interviews 
and personal contacts with their “product” to the definition of “a service” and its specific 
characteristics. This testing confirmed that by doubts were unfounded and the outcome of 
these companies is service in its nature.  
 
One aspect that was in accordance with former research and seemed to lead to an easy 
conclusion was tied to financial resources. In the case of Edicy, a tight budget occurred as a 
limiting factor in development and organizational growth. This finding was supported by 
earlier studies on start-ups. On the other hand, it did not apply to ZeroTurnaround, money 
was not mentioned as an issue nor was it confirmed to be when I directly asked about it. 
Rather the opposite, ZeroTurnaround had sufficient income from sales right from their 
establishment. Thus, a tight financial budget cannot be seen as a common industrial or start-
up specific barrier, although an obvious solution to lack of money – using outside investors – 
occurred in both cases. It became clear that investors were not involved only for financial 
reasons, but also, almost to the same extent, for the benefit of using them as mentors. Thus, 
the need for mentors and investors, and their knowledge and contacts in the area, is a 
common characteristic for these cases, not simply the lack of money among new start-ups. 
Without comparative testing of the cases and comparing my empirical material with the 
secondary data, I would have not come to this result. Thus, I perceived the analysis of 
deviant cases (even when only two cases are studied) as an important validation strategy. I 
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conducted similar testing for several findings in my data.  
 
I aimed to strengthen the reliability issue by creating low-inference descriptors – detailed 
data presentations that communicate to the reader the conversation between informant and 
researcher. Different from laconic summaries of data created by the researcher, this provides 
both a deeper understanding of the conversation and the context of the informant‟s words, 
and thus gives the reader the opportunity to decide for herself whether or not the words 
belong to a certain category.  
 
3.6 Personal biography 
 
As a qualitative researcher I reflect upon my personal background, experiences and attitudes 
related to the subjects, believing that to a certain extent these shape the research findings and 
interpretations. 
 
Prior to the current study I was rather a stranger in the start-up world. However, in a small 
society like Estonia, being active in the business sector and in addition, coming up with 
innovative ideas or products, easily gets the public attention through media channels. Even 
those business interested people who have not been particularly interested in technology 
firms or start-ups recognize at least the most popular companies in this field, having read 
about them in the newspapers, weblogs, seen them on TV being nominated for the 
Entrepreneurship Awards or heard about them presenting at some kind of conference. I had 
superficial prior knowledge about Edicy through having seen their product and knowing that 
a family member of mine has done some co-operation with its founder/CEO. This family 
member had a positive attitude towards this company and therefore suggested it to me and 
also communicated this positive image to me. With ZeroTurnaround I had had even less 
contact than with Edicy. I had seen them on the Entrepreneurship Awards 2011 and they had 
been suggested by some friends as an interesting company to get to know better. Although I 
had minimal knowledge about them, I held an open and positive attitude towards the firm. 
 
On the other hand, the area of knowledge intensive companies, professional service firms and 
entrepreneurship is not strange to me. For the last seven years I have been working in the 
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advertising and marketing research industry as a co-founder and board member of a small 
research company. For this reason I have been interested in sociology of organizations and 
particularly knowledge intensive firms through the theoretical lens and former studies, and 
also gained practical experiences in these issues in my everyday working life. I am familiar 
with the challenges of founding and developing a company in tight financial frames and on 
the basis of the enthusiasm of the founders; familiar with the periods when everybody in the 
company has to work 24/7 and endlessly prove themselves; familiar with the joint thrill that 
finally comes from success and the general freedom that comes with entrepreneurship 
(although some might say it is freedom to work all the time, instead of from 9 to 5). In 
addition, my research subjects are approximately the same age as me and although I did not 
express my stance during the research, they seemed to have values close to mine. I 
interviewed them from personal interest as much as from the need for data material and I 
admired their experiences. Both the choice of which questions to address and how I 
interpreted situations are influenced by these experiences. Although I presented myself as a 
sociology student and not as an entrepreneur (and made efforts to keep this self-definition 
during the whole study), and did not develop a conversation with the research subjects based 
on my own beliefs/experiences, I am of the opinion that this background has ensured that I 
have better understanding of the studied topics. 
 
3.7 Ethics 
 
Taking the ethical issues seriously is an important factor in the present study. As the 
empirical work for the thesis is based on using qualitative research methods in closed systems 
- privately owned companies in a highly competitive field - some sensitive information may 
be revealed that may be valuable for parties outside the companies. In addition, I interviewed 
managers, owners and employees, thus gaining insight from actors from different power 
levels and with possibly conflicting interests. Securing confidentiality and information safety 
is therefore essential.  
 
I provided the necessary information about my research project, its aim, methods and 
practical sides first when negotiating about getting the access to the companies through the 
owners. As I arranged interviews with other subjects inside the organizations by myself, I 
provided information about my project to each respondent by e-mail and further on in person 
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at the beginning of the interviews. Each respondent had the opportunity to decide if he/she 
wished to participate in the study, even if the leader/owner of the company had already 
agreed that the firm would be a case in my project. Two participants used their freedom not to 
participate by not responding either to my introductory e-mail with the invitation for 
interviews or the reminder. In addition, two companies did not respond to my e-mails during 
a longer period and I interpreted this as a lack of interest in participating in this study. One 
representative of an organization refused to participate due to lack of time, another due to 
several on-going student research projects in the company at the same time and one due to 
huge restructuring processes and thus high stress levels among the employees. I respected 
these decisions.  
 
At the beginning of each interview I asked for permission to record our conversations by 
explaining the practical reasons behind it. No one was against that. I explained to each 
respondent that these recordings will be used personally by me only for data analysis in this 
present study. After transcribing the interviews I replaced respondent names with codes, 
wrote the code meanings on a piece of paper and deleted the recordings. In addition to this I 
registered my research project with Datatilsynet as this project involves personal information 
that could be either directly or indirectly associated with individuals in the studied 
companies. 
 
At every step of this research I handled the collected information confidentially, by avoiding 
information leaks to third parties and any other possible harm that could arise from my 
involvement. However, once a manager asked me to “tell me if any of my employees say 
anything bad about us (the owners/managers)”. I perceived this as a joke and responded 
respectfully, without any intension to do so in reality. When interviewing the second case, I 
tried to approach the participants as a blank slate, without showing any former knowledge 
about the industry collected through previous interviews, although in reality I had already 
analysed all the collected information.  
 
As knowledge is a collective good and the researcher has an obligation to return the research 
results to the participants, I promised the participants a chance to review and correct the 
findings about their company before finally completing the report. In addition, I intended to 
send them this thesis once it is finished.  
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However, considering ethics, I found the most challenging aspect was getting the potential 
participants and cases to agree to participate in this study. It was difficult to find a balance 
between my purpose to get a good selection of cases in a limited timeframe and at the same 
time receiving no answers from my potential participants for quite a long period of time. On 
the one side it was important for me to get an answer, either yes or no, in order to get on with 
my search and empirical work, but trying to contact the subjects by different mediums would 
be perceived as too much pressure and put the feeling of voluntariness at risk. In this case 
maybe a more direct contact, either by phone or face-to-face would be more effective and 
reduce this ethical problem. 
 
My second concern is about using on-line mediums in the research process. Different from 
off-line, e.g., face-to-face studies, in my case the researcher had weaker control over the 
usage of data by the other party. Computer mediated research gives an opportunity for the 
interviewee to record the material as well as the researcher and in that case the researcher 
cannot assure how this material is further used. In addition, by having a virtual contact, I 
could not be sure that the environment in which conversations took place was safe on the 
interviewee side; that he would not be overheard, influenced or disturbed. Nevertheless, this 
seemed not to be an issue for my current study as the participants spoke openly and neither 
did anyone interrupt our conversations. 
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4. Empirical findings 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a good insight into the two cases empirically studied 
for the thesis. This chapter focuses on organizational characteristics that have inductively 
appeared from the field work and I will explain these in more depth by trying to find an 
answer to the following question: “What essential similarities and differences exist between 
these two cases when viewing their organizational peculiarities and managerial challenges?” 
 
The chapter is divided into 13 parts after the main thematical categories that arose from the 
field work. Mapped and described characteristics are: knowledge workers and their 
motivation; organizational routines; physical working environment; investors, financing and 
mentors; plurality of roles of the key workers; low capital intensity; employee shares and 
company‟s structure and culture.  
 
Further on I will give an overview of the main managerial challenges coming from these 
peculiarities, which are: fast growth; employee bargaining power; low predictability in the IT 
industry and issues related to job market situation and recruiting. This section ends with a 
summarizing table of the main categories covered in this chapter. 
 
4.1 Knowledge workers and their motivation 
 
The output of both companies is based on knowledge work that is done by key knowledge 
workers and supported by other employees. In Edicy these key workers are the company 
founders (with design and development backgrounds) and employed key designers and 
developers. They have the highest profitability for the company in the financial sense, a long 
history within the firm and replacing them would be a serious loss for the company. They are 
distinguishable from others (called “specialists”) by some rare skills that the company 
benefits from. Here are some examples of this („I‟ marks „the informant‟ and „R‟ marks „the 
researcher‟): 
 
R: What is the thing that makes Edicy competitive with others in this market? Or what 
is the thing that forms a basis for your success as a company, team, organization? 
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I: There are different small things that can be probably taken together with the term. 
Most of these can be taken together with the term “multi talents”. If you take a look at 
<name> who is our main developer (…) He has a very good eye on things. He is strong 
on the user and design side which is extraordinary among developers. For the second, 
his horizon of web technologies and ... I don‟t know, the whole technology world, is a 
bit… He is a bit more interested on things, he runs tests, plays through the ideas, cares 
about things, is passionate, puts more effort in than other developers do. He is not just a 
developer.  
 
*** 
 
I: Another person whom I would highlight is <name>, who has been in our team almost 
since the beginning and who has coded the whole of Edicy‟s front end. (…) He is the 
one who takes the design created by <name> and works on it so that it is able to 
communicate with the back end created by <name>. He puts these two pieces like 
together.  
 
R: Mhmh.. 
 
I: And, I‟ll say that… I have seen the work of other companies and their quality, and I 
believe that he is one of the most talented people in these areas in Estonia. He has made 
Edicy into a kind of product that does not only work well, but is very comfortable. He 
is the type of guy whom you can say that I‟d like to get this kind of thing, and he gets it 
done. He doesn‟t say that it can‟t be done or it is impossible.  
 
In ZeroTurnaround key workers are the company founders (with engineering backgrounds) 
and key engineers on the product side, but also various directors and chiefs. Although 
engineers may seem the most obvious example of the category of “knowledge workers” since 
the company operates in the high technology industry by offering a technical product; 
directors and chiefs have played, and are still playing, an essential role in taking 
responsibility for and managing the other important sides of the firm which have made the 
company successful. These are e.g. marketing and sales – the sides that generate income, 
require special knowledge, skills and understanding the global market, but would be difficult 
to handle alone for the founders with a deeply technical background. The company has put 
much effort in finding top performers to these areas and establishing a marketing and sales 
office in Boston, U.S., is seen as one tipping point for the firm. However, I categorize only 
engineers as knowledge workers in this case, because the role of sales, marketing and other 
employees (although they are seen as very important for the firm) is not directly related to 
producing knowledge intensive services.  
 
As the company operates in the global market, it has an international team and purposefully 
seeks very good experts from all over the world. All of its knowledge workers are 
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characterized by a specific valuable knowledge for the company that is based on wide 
previous experience in the industry. In general the most valuable workers are seen as those 
who have enthusiasm combined with knowledge and experience; who worry about their work 
and cannot sleep until a problem that occurs is solved. On the engineering side, being a key 
worker means having a long history in the company (since the product code has not changed 
very much and his knowledge is continually rooted in these products); being deeply 
interested and skilled in this profession for many years already; having good qualifications 
(preferably M.A. level or being a doctoral student) and being suited to the geeky culture of 
the firm. In addition to the role of these key workers, the founder and CEO of the company is 
characterized as very ambitious, which allows me to define him as one important success 
factor of the company.  
 
What these cases have in common is that their key workers often have a consultant role 
within the company in addition to their other tasks, due to their wider or deeper knowledge in 
the area than other employees. They like autonomy and a certain amount of freedom in their 
everyday operations. They know their value and how hard it is to find good experts like 
themselves in the job market. Thus, their motivation to work for exactly this type of firm is 
essential. However, in some aspects factors that motivate them are similar in both cases, 
although the organizational differences are reflected in the employee motivation as well.  
 
Knowledge workers in both companies are strongly influenced by their belief in their 
company‟s breakthrough and global success. In addition, through the products, these 
knowledge workers see the impact of their work on a big audience worldwide. As they know 
their value in the job market, they choose to get involved in projects that offer them 
possibility for challenges and self-actualization. However, the belief in the company‟s 
success poses a risk: since the IT industry is unpredictable, the much hoped success may not 
occur as soon as expected. Thus, leaning too much on this expectation may lead to motivation 
collapse. 
 
The difference between the cases occurs mainly due to the firm size: in a small company like 
Edicy a great motivator is the strong emotional connection with the product (the feel of “our 
own product”) and the relatively bigger role of each employee in such a small team, 
compared to other bigger companies. In addition, the company itself is a motivator with its 
close and informal culture. These motivations were expressed, for example, as follows: 
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R: I mean, in case of Edicy, is there any difference with competitors in how some 
processes are conducted? ... For example, maybe leadership is better than in the case of 
others or the team is distinguishable in some aspects from others? 
 
I: Yes, I think that‟s true. I think the main reason is that as we are very, very small – we 
have, compared to our competitors, you know, sometimes a ten or twenty times smaller 
team.  
 
R: Mhmh 
 
I: We have like… We can say we have ten persons, but on a daily basis only five of 
them works with these things. And if five persons have built up this kind of thing, then 
... It means also that if some change or update is needed, this team of five members can 
very, very easily and quickly get it done. Without the need to push it through some kind 
of long chain. As we have a horizontal team, it‟s possible to get all kinds of change 
done very fast, even with only one evening.  
 
R: Mhmm… 
 
I: And another thing is that as this team is very, very small, then we all feel that… We 
do not just work in a firm named Edicy OÜ, but this is like our product as well. We are 
proud of it, we have created it with our own hands and a lot of time into this. That 
means we have a totally different attitude towards it than if I worked in any kind of big 
company (…) I don‟t know if I then would have such a great respect for the product 
and if I‟d myself personally want to do anything for it. But since we have a small team 
and the product is very important for us, then this has a very good impact on the 
working culture. This is expressed in every small detail. If <name> works with the code 
and there is something to do that takes two hours, then he does it in these two hours. He 
does not search for any half-an-hour shortcuts to save time. It‟s a matter of honour for 
all of us that the product turns out fine. 
 
*** 
 
I: We compete with plenty of other companies who offer similar circumstances. Some 
of them have more potential, some have more finances. Working by us does absolutely 
not compete with… Working by us is better than by our competitors, better than in big 
developing farms. Your existence or non-existence does not affect anything in those in 
the big picture. We have a small organization, the impact of each person is huge. There 
are many start-ups like us, but the bonus is that we already have very many users. And 
that‟s not all. Our environment is safe. Not totally risk-free, but with low risk. We don‟t 
have loans, depts. Considering cash flow we are on the positive side (…) 
 
Although much bigger than Edicy, ZeroTurnaround also sets itself in opposition to the big 
programming firms (“code factories”). In the case of ZeroTurnaround, a professional team 
and organizational culture that creates the identification of employees as belonging to a 
common distinguishable group of geeks is what drives their motivation as well as other 
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aspects. In addition, as the technical employees of the firm have to operate with very different 
tasks from web to desktop applications, command-line tools, web pages, databases and 
mobile applications, variation at work is guaranteed and this avoids the job getting boring. 
Since one of the greatest risks in the case of knowledge workers is that their need for self-
actualization is unsatisfied, this diversity of tasks and challenges motivates them to stay in the 
company. The strong ownership feeling towards the company‟s products, as it is in Edicy, is 
in ZeroTurnaround to some extent replaced by the enjoyment of the process. The work is 
perceived as a hobby that requires constant efforts. However, working in a challenging and 
fascinating industry with likeable products is a great motivator for the employees as well.  
 
Hence, although the companies are different from each other in many respects, they both 
involve knowledge workers who are intrinsically motivated by the chance of self-
actualization, hope for great success of the company and the idea of giving something good to 
the world through their everyday work. The main variation of these workers and their 
motivation between the two cases comes from the difference in firm size and thus, also 
culture. 
 
4.2 Organizational routines 
 
Although the size of these companies is different and their products are also clearly different 
from each other, their organizational routines are to a large extent very similar. Neither of 
them has established very strict routines that follow some prescriptions. In principle, both of 
them may be characterized by the usage of an agile approach in software development, which 
in general means valuing individuals and interactions, delivering working software, customer 
collaboration and responding to change (Sutherland 2010). The agile approach is not a 
narrow method, rather an umbrella that covers different methods like Scrum, Lean, Crystal, 
FDD, DSDM and eXtreme programming. In Edicy a specific Scrum-methodology is used, 
but in ZeroTurnaround processes in the company do not follow such a certain framework. In 
that it is left up to team leaders to decide how to approach the problems and tasks that occur, 
and whether or not a specific method suits a situation. However, the general starting point to 
the software development is similar in both companies and this creates comparable everyday 
routines. 
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Both of the companies are opposed to onerous bureaucracy. They hold as few as possible 
formal meetings. In Edicy, project team meetings take place every two weeks (following the 
Scrum-methodology, the new product cycle starts after two weeks and ends with presenting a 
new release or update) and the team is kept on course by Monday morning meet-ups. In 
ZeroTurnaround the main meetings take place once a week and they are separate for the 
directors, engineering leadership and marketing leadership. Twice a week short meetings 
about products take place in order to synchronize the action of team members. Most of the 
communication in these companies takes place ad hoc, face-to-face or using online video 
conferencing tools (Skype or GoToMeeting). 
 
Both of the companies have a somewhat flexible attitude towards working time. In Edicy, it 
is recommended to work from 9am to 6pm and to be present in the office. If everything is 
done, working from other places is also allowed, but coming to the office is recommended. 
Working from a distance is seen as less effective and tied to several other expenses, and the 
company does not have any successful examples of homeworking. In ZeroTurnaround, 
knowledge employees have “half-free” working hours, which means that they are mostly 
present in the office from 10:30-11am to 4-5pm, but during other times of the day, employees 
decide themselves how structure their working hours. It is accepted to come and leave the 
office later than others and vice versa. This “social agreement” is not officially stated, but is 
due to meetings that usually take place between 11 am and 5 pm. Due to the U.S. office and 
market sometimes employees also have to work in the evenings (e.g., to conduct demos) and 
in this case the worker adjusts his working time accordingly. Employees work from home for 
family reasons, sickness, jet lag or if they need to concentrate more and to get something 
specific done. Working from home is mostly used as a part of a working day: before noon 
employees work from the office and if something needs to get done later in the evening, they 
go home and continue working from there.  
 
Thus, the general approach to the functional organizational processes is the same in both 
companies, but smaller differences occur in the specific arrangements.  
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4.3 Physical working environment 
 
ZeroTurnaround has four offices – two in Estonia, one in Prague and one in Boston. As the 
engineering department (which is also their biggest office) is situated in Estonia, I will focus 
on the peculiarities of this office, assuming that it influences to some extent their everyday 
organizational life. Their office could be characterized by two main aspects.  
 
 
In the picture: ZeroTurnaround’s employees in their office. 
 
First, it is transparent because of a lot of glass walls and sliding doors. This creates the 
feeling of openness and accessibility as there is no place to “hide” from others. All workers 
sit side-by-side and are visible to each other, without any separate closed offices for leaders 
or owners. Second, the office has a homely design, with sofas and bag-chairs for relaxing, 
and various entertainment tools like Xbox, table football, etc. A good kitchen is an additional 
feature that is often used by employees to cook and bake, and that is not a common element 
in many workplaces. Due to these conditions, workers perceive their office as a cosy place 
where they like to spend their time after work as well. One informant described it through the 
following example: 
 
I: What is very nice is that when I once wanted to show our office to my 
acquaintances... I was trying to figure out how to disarm it, when we noticed that it 
already was disarmed. We then went in and saw a guy working. After a while he came 
to the kitchen to bake something (he lives in a student dorm). Then, after this, 
somebody came to watch movies on the screens, since he didn‟t have such a big screen 
at home. And then another co-worker came to play Guitar Hero. The office was full of 
people, they want to come here in their free time too. 
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Edicy has two offices, both of them in Estonia. As they approach one of these as their main 
office (and because the other one is still very new), I will also focus on this single office. 
They too have an open plan office where everyone is visible to each other and working side-
by-side together in one room. The office has a kitchen for the employees and a separate 
meeting room with bag chairs and glass walls. Different to ZeroTurnaround, the company has 
not provided so many entertainment tools and no specific wish for this was expressed through 
interviews either. In general their office reflects their horizontal structure and openness in 
communication and everyday work.  
 
 
In the picture: Edicy’s office. 
 
4.4 Low capital intensity 
 
As both of the studied companies operate in the global IT market with products that are based 
on a specific knowledge, their main source of capital is people and the intellectual property 
created by them. Their “product” is intangible, being software on computers and thus it does 
not require specific costs in materials, real estate or other physical elements. On the other 
hand, it is a well scalable business, where the profit grows independently from costs: the 
company‟s income does not depend directly on the amount of money, time or materials 
invested into the company. If production were to stop, sales would not disappear at once.  
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Low capital intensity is also reflected in the investment side. It is rather easy to start a 
company in this industry as strong financial capital is not a prerequisite. On the other hand, 
the product development stage takes a lot of money, so one has to believe in the product 
potential in order to take the risk. It is possible to diminish the costs by growing organically 
and developing using an initially small team of founders, although this often means high 
work-loads. 
 
4.5 Plurality of roles of the key workers 
 
For both companies the early years involved high workloads and long working hours, 
exceeding the normal working week. This has come about due to the small teams and the 
specific culture, which is often characteristic of start-ups. As ZeroTurnaround grew bigger, 
its beliefs and habits changed. Now it is believed that creativity is more valuable than the 
hours put into the work. For Edicy, high workloads characterized the firm during its first 
years and the need for this has also been reduced. Nevertheless, to some extent this still is 
present, being a part of the firm‟s culture. Due to its small size and flexibility it is possible for 
the team to implement changes to the product and to undertake tasks very quickly. This 
means that working overtime is sometimes necessary and this is seen as rather as a positive 
sign. Edicy is remarkably smaller in size than ZeroTurnaround, on the other hand, it is the 
lack of financial opportunities that has meant that it has not been possible to hire enough and 
the best people to do the jobs. In addition it is the wish of its CEO to hold the company small 
and flexible (and thus employees with multiple roles).  
 
I: I believe in small organizations, fast movement, internal motivation, generalists, 
multi-talents, internal strength. My dream team is like me, where everything is 
horizontal, everybody is equal. 20 persons in maximum, and no great leader and teacher 
exist. Everybody is a great leader and teacher.  
 
In Edicy, the founders describe themselves as multi-talents who manage to handle all kinds of 
tasks and roles. They have several different roles, as they cannot focus on only one aspect. 
They describe themselves as generalists (as opposed to specialists like others in the 
company), who in principle could cover all the necessary tasks by themselves. This means a 
fast start at the beginning, as the company did not have to spend money on hiring people for 
66 
 
the tasks that could done by the founders themselves. A negative result is lack of focus on the 
important aspects, as too many operational tasks take most of one‟s time. Multiple roles are 
caused also by non-automatic technical solutions which require a “hands-on” approach from 
the technical side workers. This involves some risks, e.g., all the knowledge of the technical 
systems is held by one person: 
 
I: One thing that defines my current job is that I am the only one who knows how this 
system is working. We do not have more people who have a complex understanding of 
it. If I get hit by a bus, then others will put a lot effort in to get a picture of it. We have 
done it in four years in a rush and it is not wholly documented. A big part of the work is 
still in my head. 
 
However, the company has started a restructuring process this year, hiring new people on the 
Edicy side, establishing an additional office, moving its main office to bigger rooms and 
trying to delegate former operational tasks of the CEO to other employees. Compared to the 
very first years, the working hours and habits have now become more calm and stable. 
 
 4.6 Financing, investors and mentors 
 
Both of the studied companies are tied to investors, although now they also manage to cover 
their expenses without them. Investors‟ money has secured them a faster start at the 
beginning and provided them with some specific knowledge that has been important for 
making the right decisions. None of the founders had strong entrepreneurial education or 
experience, so the advice from external investors and mentors has been of great assistance.  
Edicy has taken investors‟ money partly due to a trend which was prevalent among start-ups 
back then: it was advised to raise and spend as much investment as possible. Now they 
believe that they can manage without it as well. An essential advantage of investors has been 
their advice to raise the perspective beyond a local market, which has led to the global 
multilingual nature of Edicy as it is today. However, their relationships with investors have 
not been without difficulties and several challenges have arisen. Conflicts of interests have 
occurred in disagreements about which way to go and how, as well as with regard to concrete 
actions. In the recession times, when a lot of companies went bankrupt, investors asked for 
their money back and therefore, the company had to move from a the global service Edicy to 
the Fraktal side, to do tailor-made design projects and increase the money flow. Thus, 
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investor‟s actions were not in accordance with the strategy and hopes of the company leaders, 
who kept in mind the long-term interests of the company. In addition, a conflict of interest 
also underlies the different aims of investors and employees: the former wish to earn as much 
dividends as possible, while the latter want to get as high a salary as possible. 
ZeroTurnaround has got a rather smaller amount of investments compared to other start-ups 
in general. At the beginning its initial mother company invested 200 000 euro in the firm and 
an additional 100 000 euro came from a national foundation. After a while, a U.S. venture 
capital firm bought a majority stake of the company. Although in their industry capital 
invested into companies is not big, the competition in the market is fierce.  
 
ZeroTurnaround has favoured rather organic growth and plans to do this in the future as well. 
Due to a strong business model, most of its money has come from sales, right from the 
beginning. As typically in the first year 100% of a firm‟s income goes to marketing, 
ZeroTurnaround was different: only a quarter of its money went to marketing, the rest was 
left for supporting other operations in the company. Thus, the main benefits from investors 
were their advice, connections and possibilities for networking, and help with building up an 
office. No conflict of interest has been perceived - they have a common interest which is to 
grow the firm as fast as possible. In addition, the common purpose is to sell more software, 
build software with better quality and to gain even more market share. However, conflict of 
interests may occur if the company does not perform as well as expected. Although company 
earnings are big enough and no financial support from investors is needed, a reason for 
raising money in the future may be if the company wanted to buy another firm.  
 
Separate from the need for money, the need for advice from experienced mentors can be 
seen. Both of the companies expressed a clear need for this, noting that it makes the starting 
years much easier. As ZeroTurnaround was initially part of a bigger software development 
firm, they supported the ZeroTurnaround team with the necessary advice and environment. 
This “incubator” was comfortable for the team who could then focus on the product side.  
 
R: When establishing a company, how important do you feel it is to have a mentor or 
advisor in making the right decisions or going the right way? 
 
I: I think it‟s extremely important. It makes things easier.  
 
68 
 
R: Mhmh…Was it important to you? And in which way then? 
 
I: At different life stages you look up to different people. (…) From the company‟s 
perspective, you need people to whom you can go and ask things, because you don‟t 
know everything and it‟s easier to learn from other people‟s mistakes – both 
considering time and money. (…) We have received support from our initial mother 
firm, in the aspects that people with development and technical background usually do 
not know. (…) If we hadn‟t got it from there, we would have got it from some other 
source – I do not know where. But you just have to communicate with people and use 
their help.  
 
Hence, it is stressed that one has to find mentors or investors who are really willing to work 
with the company – not just those whose name sounds good or who provide enough money. 
In addition to investors, the company has a Product Advisory Board (PAB) which consists of 
five advisors on the product development side. They are used to provide honest feedback, act 
as a community representative and help to increase adoption. The firm meets with the PAB 
once a quarter. 
 
Similarly to ZeroTurnaround, Edicy also has an Advisory Board (AB) as mentors. It consists 
of three persons and communication with them happens almost on a daily basis. Their main 
help has been their advice on how to raise the perspective, although they provide feedback 
and their opinions on other aspects as well. In both companies, these advisors are sometimes 
listened to and sometimes ignored – their advice is not taken uncritically as the only truth, 
rather put in the context of other opinions and factors.  
 
4.7 Company’s structure  
 
The structure of Edicy is characterized by the term “organic leadership”, that in the current 
case to a great extent means leaderless leadership. This is an approach that emphasizes the 
lack of hierarchy and formal leadership in the company. Everything is meant to be based on 
consensus and free will, without any certain leaders or even project managers, although in 
decision making the final word usually goes to the two founders.  
 
I: I am myself such a charismatic type, and I don‟t bother doing things by the book. I 
don‟t bother with taking everything organic out of life and getting clinical. I don‟t know 
anything about “the leadership”. Maybe I do have here some room for improvement, 
but instead of reading thick textbooks, I operate using my own gut feeling.  
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In the division of tasks or decision making, nothing is imposed upon anybody – those who 
feel like wanting to take the responsibility step up and volunteer to do it. Often this division 
comes on the basis on the character and skills of different employees. This principle is also 
used in the individual work of employees:  
 
R: What does it mean – horizontal structure – for you? In the meaning of leadership for 
example? 
 
I: No leadership. 
 
R: Something has to be lead, or isn‟t it so? 
 
I: If you are a one-man company, whom do you lead then? Nobody. In a four-man 
company you don‟t lead anybody either. Everything happens on the basis of consensus, 
and... I understand where you‟re going with that. With 14 persons [counted Edicy and 
Fraktal together] roles and communication chains distinguish from each other so that 
different levels occur. In a team with less than 10 members we don‟t have such levels 
yet, I was not a leader but rather like an older colleague. This perceived difference has 
started to come now when I realize that I move higher and further away from others. 
(…) 
 
R: What about making decisions in the company? When everybody is equal around 
you? 
 
I: In decision making responsibility is taken by those who want to take it. These 
develop dependent of each person‟s character and abilities. If there‟s a meeting (...) 
then people either move along or take initiative. And there‟s no formerly established 
system about who may take the initiative. 
 
R: Is it possible that no problems are related to this order, that everything goes so 
smoothly? 
 
I: If everybody was like me we‟d have one problem: if two persons stepped up at the 
same time. 
 
*** 
 
I: With us, everybody comes to work according to their conscience. And they do 
whatever they want to do. If they prefer to be on Facebook all day long, then let them 
be there. I‟m glad we don‟t have these kinds of people. I try not to get involved in this 
process at all. I am ready to help them if they need it, but I don‟t want to dictate in any 
way how they must do their job. I get my feedback by seeing how they are feeling and 
on the other side, I take a look at the financial metrics.  
 
 
However, although the company‟s structure is seen to be to a great extent horizontal (at least 
up until this research, now however, with 14 and more employees some hierarchy elements 
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have started emerge), the founders usually take the responsibility for final decisions upon 
themselves. One of them has the final word on the design and business side, the other on the 
technical side. All other employees are horizontally under them, aligning with their opinions. 
Due to the small size of the firm, most of the communication and leading happens through ad 
hoc contacts, personally by CEOs. This means the possibility to carry out changes in tasks, 
products, etc. very quickly, provides flexibility in decisions and allows for rapid adjusting 
within the firm.  
 
In ZeroTurnaround, the company is seen as having a “hybrid structure”. Similarly to Edicy, 
this means no strict hierarchy set for everyday communication processes, but however, a 
clear hierarchy is established in the division of responsibility. Three levels of hierarchy exist, 
but different teams are well integrated and collaborating - developers collaborate with 
marketing to provide a basis for marketing communication, write weblog posts, conduct 
demos together with sales people, etc. It is well understood who is responsible for what: 
The CEO is responsible for the whole company (…), directors are responsible for their 
divisions; product managers are responsible for their products; team leaders are 
responsible for their teams. Everything has its defined owner. Company owners are 
responsible for ensuring everybody is collaborating, knowing the vision, doing things 
right and in the right order.  
This means that divided responsibility is used in the case of problems as well - if an 
employee does something wrong, he has to take the responsibility for it and so too does his 
manager. However, the looser structure has its strengths and challenges: increased autonomy 
results in increased creativity of employees, but for the leader it means less control over 
them.  
 
The company‟s structure is not visually remarkable in its everyday life - all team members 
are sitting and working together in the same room. In the meetings, the hierarchy becomes a 
bit more obvious (nevertheless, logical argumentation is what counts, although experts in a 
certain domain are heard more than others), as well as in the amount of traveling and the 
chance of organizing others‟ work. Similarly to Edicy, the company is characterized by easy 
access to leaders and no standardized ways of executing management. Rather the opposite is 
considered important: the skill of reacting to the specific situation and finding a solution 
when a problem arises, by adapting the situation and people. 
 
 
71 
 
4.8 Company’s culture 
 
Organizational culture is one aspect that clearly distinguishes these two cases. The main thing 
that these companies have in common is their confrontation attitude towards bureaucracy. 
However, besides this, these cases tend to be clearly different from each other.  
The culture in Edicy is strongly associated with the fact that its workers have mainly come 
from a network of friends. It is quite a closed system which is characterized by strong ties 
between people and a relatively long history together. There are very few persons who have 
been hired directly. Some employees know each other from school, others from a previous 
workplace. This peculiarity has resulted in trust between co-workers and a good 
specialization among them, as everybody is familiar with each other‟s strengths and 
weaknesses. 
R: Do you have some kind of problems related to this? Maybe you can‟t say everything 
you need to a friend because of your relationship and so on? 
 
I: At the beginning of a relationship you don‟t want to speak badly of people. But if you 
have worked together for 4-5 years, you get a rational understanding that sometimes 
you may criticize others, no one takes it personally. Of course, the fact that we get 
along well, creates some other nuances, but in the big picture it is a benefit. If we didn‟t 
trust each other so much, I think a lot of things would remain untold. You‟d feel like: 
why should I raise this problem? Let it be, I don‟t care. I just come to the office in the 
morning and leave it in the evening, but to worry about if everything is 100% fine – this 
is not my problem. 
 
These relationships are one strong basis for motivation to work in Edicy. Due to a small team 
and leader‟s specific approach to leadership, no visual chain of command exists and 
knowledge workers are provided with much autonomy. However, this friendship-based 
relationship does not mean many informal activities after working hours. Sometimes the 
company arranges common dinners, another tradition is to rent a cottage house outside the 
town and arrange trips there, combining working and entertainment/relaxing. In general it 
doesn‟t happen very often - it seems like they get enough from communicating and working 
side-by-side so that no one presumes that they should spend time together after work as well.  
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In the picture: Edicy team working outside the office. 
 
The company‟s culture is influenced by its employees as well as its leaders. The culture of 
Edicy is mediated by its CEO who has taken the communicator‟s role in the company. He is 
the one who motivates when needed and tries to solve problems that appear in the 
communication processes. 
 
I: If we face a motivation crisis, then of course it has its effect on its founders as well. 
They have invested even more time and money into this company. They have to look in 
the mirror as well. But he [CEO] has always been the first person who comes and talks 
about the reasons why we do it. We have not had such a thing that we collect the team 
together and say that we have done a very good job. It usually happens through smaller, 
personal contacts.  
 
However, this type of culture that consists of a network of friends poses a challenge - it is 
difficult to hire new employees into such a closed system. On the one hand it sets higher 
standards to its possible employees as they have to suit the existing group of friends in order 
to get hired or keep their job. In addition, it may be hard for those new employees to adapt to 
the situation as informal events are not usual in the company. Otherwise these would make it 
easier to get familiar with co-workers, adapt to their jokes and ways of communication. First 
hiring and after a while letting the employee go has happened in the company several times; 
although the reason behind this has not always been the lack of adaption by newcomers. 
 
In ZeroTurnaround the organization‟s culture could be characterized by three main aspects: 
collaboration culture, geek culture and learning culture. Collaboration culture is expressed 
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in the work processes, meaning that marketing and engineering collaborate closely, and 
product development and engineering are one common unit of the company.  
 
I: We do things very differently from others, we have such a strong collaboration 
culture. In a big organization collaboration does not exist very often. With us, people 
collaborate – for example, marketing and engineering collaborate. In a big company 
you are responsible for nothing; with us, everybody is responsible for quite a big part. It 
can be done only when you have a very good team and you can trust them, they don‟t 
mess it up. We have such a team and it suits us well.  
 
The other peculiarity that characterizes their organization‟s culture is geekiness. Being a geek 
has a positive meaning for them and it unites the company‟s (technical) employees into a 
coherent group with its specific identity and ways of behaviour. It may be expressed by a 
specific appearance (e.g.,wearing a funny hat at work); by logical thinking (therefore 
matching also well with the nature of engineers); inside jokes (where everything is related to 
programming); hobbies (playing computer games, board games), etc.  
 
I: The geek culture is expressed in big glasses and backpacks (.…) It is rather a 
lifestyle, way of thinking and speaking. We have jokes like, for example, if you didn‟t 
sleep well last night and you come to work with eyes yet half-closed, then one could 
say: “Didn‟t you boot up correctly? You have to do a restart”. 
 
R: (smirks) Mhmh. 
 
I: Or if you look outside the window and see an elderly person who can‟t cross the 
road, then you may say: “Look, she has some kind of a bug inside.” You try to 
associate everything with programming and always approach everything logically. For 
geeks, it is very hard to communicate with people who do not think logically. 
 
Being a geek and thus fitting into the company‟s culture is seen as a prerequisite when hiring 
new people and it is actively promoted in everyday working life. Informal events after work 
(parties, playing board games together, etc.), once a week ordering lunch to the office and 
eating together with the whole team and hosting visitors from abroad at least once a month – 
these activities are supported by familiar and humorous everyday communication. The role of 
leaders and founders is important here as well – company founders themselves are geeky, fun 
and hardworking, and thus they are an influence on the company‟s culture. 
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In the pictures: a stand of ZeroTurnaround (on the left) and their team meeting. 
 
The third characteristic of ZeroTurnaround is its learning culture. Constant learning and 
self-development is obligatory for those working in the company as the tasks vary quite a lot 
and persons need to be able to complete them. Ability and readiness for learning is searched 
for in the job interviews (it is asked both quite directly and secured through hiring employees 
with a university degree). One informant described it this way: 
 
I: Learning, developing yourself is “a must”. It doesn‟t mean that you have to read 
books in the evenings and to study. At work every day you see plenty of things you 
have not had any contact with before. Compared to the “code factories” where you 
receive a stack of papers that has been written by an analyst, 10 pages of Word doc – 
we do not have that kind of thing. With us, you get told: “Study, write it yourself”. 
Others will look it through, say that “it is better to be done this way” etc. Then you 
think, research, use Google, see what comes out. Most things are those you haven‟t 
done before.  
 
R: On the other side, it is less comfortable this way? 
 
I: (chuckle) You cannot rest on your laurels. It helps to keep your mind sharp.  
 
In addition to this, participation on specific conferences all around the world happens on a 
regular basis – company representatives participate in these at least once a month. On the one 
side, presenting products at the conferences is a strategic marketing approach for the 
company. On the other side, the company representatives can gather new information, learn 
new things and sometimes also give a presentation by themselves. The company‟s CEO has 
been speaking at prestigious Java conferences for over five years and published papers. The 
company itself has established an annual international Java conference. 
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However, although the organizational culture has an essential meaning for the identity of 
ZeroTurnaround, preserving the current culture during and after the rapid growth of the 
organization is perceived as a challenge. In addition, although the company has offices on 
different continents, it is perceived to be necessary to hold onto the culture throughout the 
whole company. A solution used to handle this logistical problem is much traveling and 
trying to get the team together as much as possible. 
 
Thus, Edicy and ZeroTurnaround have both shown a distinguishable, yet different, 
organizational culture. Both of these are characterized by open and familiar communication, 
no hierarchy on the communication side and great accessibility of leaders. The culture of 
Edicy seems to have naturally grown from their everyday communication and co-working, 
being thus well suited to a small team such as theirs. In ZeroTurnaround, the culture has 
different facets (geek culture, collaboration culture and learning culture) and thus requires 
more concrete actions to hold onto it. At the same time its culture is coherent to the identity 
of their employees and products.  
 
4.9 Employee ownership 
 
In both companies, some employees are motivated and retained by offering them company 
shares. As both of the firms are start-ups, which are hoped to grow rapidly in value, owning 
these shares involves a possibility of generating a lot of money in the future. However, as the 
firms have not yet reached their target level, this has not yet materialised. 
 
In Edicy, employees have a rather symbolic number of shares at the moment, which were all 
given at once during the recession. These were given instead of one month‟s salary, when 
investors decided not to extend their investment and asked for their money back. Although 
the shares were first meant to be divided some years later, a deal was done with the 
employees to reduce their salary by 25% for four months and to complement this with 
company shares. This was a huge motivator during these times and in general seen as fair – 
the employees see a straight relation between the results of their own work and the 
company‟s value. In addition, instead of hiring new people, it seemed better to lock valuable 
employees into the firm. However, as the rapid growth did not happen as soon as expected, 
the motivational effect of these shares diminished. As the firm is small, these do not mean 
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increased power in strategic decision making either. Different from the beginning, the 
employees do not believe in such a huge growth during the next couple of years that would 
make them very rich. As no financial benefits are coming from the shares right now, owning 
these does not affect employee behaviour at the moment.  
 
In ZeroTurnaround, company shares were divided among only a few of people and as the 
firm has now over 50 employees, most of them are not the company owners. The division of 
shares was used in order to lock valuable employees into the firm and to prevent them 
becoming demotivated and looking around for a new employer. The division of shares 
happens according to a matrix based on responsibility taken by the potential candidate. The 
person who is eligible for this should be at a certain level within the company, a team leader 
or a higher position, e.g., being responsible for five or more persons or have an equal level of 
responsibility for a product. There are individual exceptional reasons for giving company 
shares, such as if an important person leaving would cause chaos in the firm.  
 
However, similarly to Edicy, the time for high profits is yet to come and having shares 
motivates employees to help others in the company, and to monitor others‟ work somewhat 
more, ensuring good quality through peer control.  
 
4.10 Fast growth as a challenge 
 
Growing big is seen as an organizational challenge in both companies. Although one of them 
has five employees and the other over 50, both of them are to some extent afraid of the 
change that comes with growing bigger. In Edicy, this is seen as a challenge mainly for 
employee motivation: 
 
I: One thing, that may reduce our competitive advantage in the market is growth. When 
the organization grows, the role of each person diminishes. (…) They don‟t get anything 
done, it‟s sad to see how a product is continually at the same low quality as it was years 
ago. People quit in groups, because in spite of the high salary, they have no impact on 
anything. The system is so stuck that it needs a huge powerful shake. But in organizations 
like Microsoft or Google, no such shakes occur. Employees have forgotten their own 
ability to affect anything. (…) In such big organizations you need the success of the 
whole in order to compensate for the pointlessness of a small person. In these large 
organizations about two important things happen per year, but they employ tens of 
thousands of people. Not everybody gets an opportunity to work with something 
important. 
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In addition, a different kind of leadership may be needed when the organization exceeds the 
boundaries of a small company.  
 
ZeroTurnaround has experienced a fast growth over recent years (two til four times per 
year). Also they believe that a lot of things, like communication and organizational culture, 
usually get worse during this growth. Keeping the current organizational culture requires 
effort and planned activities, but it is seen as an important feature of this company. The 
second main challenge is finding a suitable workforce to support the growth. In addition, the 
transition period from one size to another may involve some inefficiencies due to the unequal 
proportion of workers already existing and the new workers hired to support these. I will 
explain the topics related to the workforce and hiring in more depth in the next subchapter.  
 
Third, a challenge associated with growth is the need for removing insecurity and spreading 
risks by building up a new successful product. Launching proper second and third products 
would mean that the team really knows what it is doing; the successful debut with the first 
product may have been just good luck. 
 
The fourth challenge is a direct managerial challenge. It means creating new analytics that 
adjust to the growth situation and give a good understanding of income and outgoings. This is 
necessary as a basis for other managerial decisions and adjusting the company‟s wider 
strategy. 
 
Thus, growing poses some important challenges for the companies. In both cases, growth is 
seen as something desired, but on the other hand risky for the organization. In the larger 
company, several new challenges have arisen with growth, which are not yet a reality for 
Edicy. 
 
4.11 Job market situation and hiring as a challenge 
 
Both studied IT companies are established and situated (at least with their main office) in 
Estonia. This means their local job market is very narrow. The core of it consists of the 
78 
 
graduates from the country‟s biggest university which offers, among others courses, an 
education in IT.  
 
Edicy has recruited locally. One reason for this is that the company is not attractive to the 
world‟s best professionals. Due to financial restrictions it has not been possible to hire from 
abroad and to get as good employees as the existing ones (or even better).  
 
R: One task of a company‟s leader is to put together a good team.  
 
I: Yes. 
 
R: How have you done this? What kind of characteristics and criteria show that “this 
person suits our team”? 
 
I: Taking a look at the team, it consists mostly of persons I have worked with before 
and those who I have seen can do it, others have dropped out. Based on this I could say 
that we aren‟t very good hirers. We have rather tried to go flat against… We have taken 
people who are good enough to do something, but we haven‟t searched for the best in 
the world. We have hired in the financial frames that we have, those who will definitely 
do the job we need. But it works this way. (…) How one should hire, this is quite 
different in the case of limited and unlimited finances. (…) We take in this frame that 
our monthly turnover is 11000 euro and if we‟d hire people from this category [experts 
from U.S.], then we‟d lack half of the gross salary. (…) We have not figured out how to 
hire in such a small organization as we are. 
 
On the other hand, top professionals in the global job market do not find Edicy challenging 
for their resume. In addition to lack of finances, the company does not have a strong belief in 
working from a distance – this is seen as creating communication and trust problems. All this 
has led to a lack of good employees. In a small job market like Estonia, it is difficult to find 
good professionals (designers, developers, etc.), as a lot of big companies are also hiring at 
the same time. On the one hand, this bottleneck means work overloads for existing employees 
and a barrier for developing as quickly as they would want to. On the other hand, a slower 
development tempo means less personal sacrifices from the employee side. 
 
ZeroTurnaround hires engineers from Estonia (Eastern Europe is also planned for the 
future) and sales and marketing from Boston (and then from the rest of the U.S.). Due to the 
strong education system and a suitable entrepreneurial culture that is similar to the U.S., they 
are satisfied with their hired engineers. Although they lack the special knowledge and 
experience that the work in ZeroTurnaround requires (as work in this company is different 
79 
 
from the work in other companies due to the specific product), some training within the firm 
solves these problems.  
 
Most of its engineers are seen as experts or very good in their area. Only a few of its 
employees are at bachelor degree level, others hold a master degree in informatics and 5 of its 
employees are doctoral students. In this respect the company is distinguishable from Edicy. 
ZeroTurnaround requires its employees to have a higher education and this is for several 
reasons:  
 learning is very important, but most people who have not studied at university are not 
motivated to study by themselves, to learn new things. They search for people who 
are interested in learning;  
 problems that the company solves are technically very difficult, therefore, they would 
like not necessarily the best, but very good employees - the ones who do a predictably 
good job;  
 having a degree from university indicates one‟s interest towards the profession. 
 
In addition to the formal prerequisites, its employees have to be wise, experienced and 
enthusiastic, and be able to complete tasks on time. Lately, the company has recruited some 
experienced workers to balance the young age of the company‟s founders and workers. This 
aim to hire very good professionals was reflected in its hiring campaign in 2011, where 
developers were asked to solve a series of riddles as part of the job application process (see 
the pictures below).  
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In the pictures: a special type of job advertisement published by ZeroTurnaround in a newspaper. 
After solving the programming riddle (on the left), programmers were guided to the next riddle (on 
the right) and so on. 
 
Due to these high prerequisites set for candidates, it is difficult for the company to hire a 
sufficient workforce on the engineering side. The growth of good engineers from the 
universities is too small and slow, and several competitors are already recruiting in the same 
job market. The company cannot recruit students from the university at the moment, partly 
because of a lack of persons who would be able to train them. An important reason here is the 
high demands on Java developers. To solve technically very difficult Java problems, a 
university degree is not enough; a candidate has to have 2-3 years of prior individual, in 
depth experience with these issues. This is not something one can directly teach to an 
employee, however, recruiting from universities may be needed in the next couple of years.  
  
The other alternative to the workforce problem would be to hire engineers from other 
countries (e.g., Boston, U.S.). A barrier would be different time zones and its influence on 
team communication (e.g., having a maximum of two hours of common working time). It 
could work in the case of different teams working on different projects, a competent 
independent team and a strong team leader present there. 
Thus, comparing the challenge of finding quality workforce for Edicy and ZeroTurnaround, 
for Edicy, low financial possibilities is the main barrier to hiring top experts, but this is not 
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the case for ZeroTurnaround. For them, the growth of engineers from universities is too slow 
and soon they will need more experts in this area than the university can “produce”. 
However, both of the companies are sceptical about hiring technical workers from abroad, 
although this may have to be a reality for ZeroTurnaround in the very near future.  
 
4.12 Employee bargaining power as a challenge  
 
Although high employee bargaining power is not seen as the main challenge for managers, 
some signs of it were still recognizable. In Edicy, knowledge workers expressed their clear 
preference for autonomy and informal leadership as a motivator for staying with the firm: 
 
R: As I understand it, the main thing that motivates you to work at Edicy is self-
realization, self-expression and doing something big? 
 
I: That‟s correct. The salary… It may be important when you are entering the job 
market and you can‟t even imagine that a job can be anything more than just the salary. 
It comes with time. When you see how things are done in other companies, when you 
hear what kind of clients they have, how‟s their management, working style, then… 
 
R: Mhmh.. 
 
I: I myself have learned to value my freedom to do the job just the way I like it. These 
are small things that matter. If I compare it with some of our competitors in Estonia, 
then our style – that in the morning I may open Skype and say at our team conversation 
“hey, I will work from home this morning”, and I don‟t have to explain it or bring a 
medical certificate or anything – this is actually a very, very rare thing in Estonia. On 
the personal level, this is enormous freedom. It would be very difficult for me to go to 
work in another company just because I got paid 1000-2000 EEK (or 100-200 euros) 
more there. This autonomy, that working in Edicy or Fraktal is giving me, is hard to 
measure in money. 
 
In ZeroTurnaround, key workers with strong previous experience in the industry are seen as 
having stronger bargaining power than others, just as they already know their value. Their 
curriculum vitae is the aspect that signals their quality, the company is willing to invest in 
them and thus, they can ask more money or bargain over other conditions. However, on the 
engineering side, there is no fear of key engineers leaving the company and starting their own 
business nor that competitors will tempt their key workers away. The main threat for 
knowledge workers (who are seen as intrinsically motivated) is that they may lose their 
interest towards their job or company and are therefore willing to move on. 
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4.13 Low predictability in the IT industry as a challenge 
Low predictability in the IT industry is seen as a challenge, mentioned by ZeroTurnaround. 
Entering a new market or launching a new product is not predictable and it requires 
continuous change in strategies and plans. Everything is unsecure: if one can put the plans 
into practice, if the chosen direction is right and if it is possible to execute at the right tempo 
and at the right level of quality. However, it is necessary to launch new products in addition 
to the first and main one to disperse risks, in case the market becomes full or a new 
technology replaces the former ones. On the same time, it is difficult to build up the second 
and third products to be as successful as the first. The company leaders have a lot of ideas 
here, but as the development stage is expensive, it is possible to invest only in a few of them; 
therefore, the right choice has to be made in this unsecure environment.  
 
The following tables summarize all the studied peculiarities and managerial challenges in 
these cases. 
Table 3. Organizational/industrial characteristics of the studied cases. 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
/ INDUSTRIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
CASE 1 CASE 2 
 
Knowledge workers 
 
Founders, designers, developers 
 
Founders, engineers 
Motivation of 
knowledge workers 
 Self-actualization 
 Influencing a big audience 
 Belief in company‟s 
breakthrough 
 Emotional connection to the 
product 
 Importance of each 
employee in a small firm 
 
 Self-actualization 
 Influencing a big audience 
 Belief in company‟s breakthrough 
 Work as hobby 
 Various tasks and challenges at 
work 
 Good team and organizational 
culture as a source of motivation 
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Routines  Online video conferencing 
as an important 
communication tool 
 Deviations from working 
9am-6pm allowed Presence 
in the office strongly 
recommended 
 Project team meetings every 
two weeks 
 Team update meetings once 
a week 
 Ad hoc communication and 
conversations with the CEO 
almost every day 
 A specific agile approach in 
product development: 
Scrum-methodology 
 
 
 Online video conferencing as an 
important communication tool  
 “half free” working hours 
 Possibility for partial working 
from home  
 Standard meetings once a week 
for directors, engineering and 
marketing leadership  
 Short product meetings two times 
a week 
 Ad hoc communication 
 
Physical working 
environment 
 
 Open space office, 
everybody is visible and 
together in one room 
 Bag chairs, kitchen 
 
 Transparent office, open space, 
glass walls and sliding doors No 
place to “hide”, everybody is 
visible to everyone  
 Homely office with sofas, 
bagchairs and entertainment tools  
 Kitchen in the office that is used 
for baking and cooking by 
employees 
 Office as a place where 
employees like to spend time after 
work as well 
Plurality of roles of 
the key persons  
 Founders see themselves as 
multi-talents 
 Multiple roles caused to 
non-automatic technical 
solutions and being a small 
firm 
 
 During the first years high 
workloads and working hours 
exceeding the normal working 
week due to the small team 
 Change of beliefs and habits 
when company grew  
Financing, investors 
and mentors 
 
 A trend among start-ups to 
raise and spend as much 
investment as possible 
 Investment helped to get a 
quick start 
 Conflicts about strategy with 
investors 
 Conflict of interests between 
investors and employees 
 Investors‟ actions were not 
in accordance with long-
term interests of the 
company 
 Relatively small investments from 
venture capitalists and other 
parties 
 Organic growth: due to a strong 
business model, most of the 
money has come from sales 
 Investors help in building an 
office and networking 
 No conflict of interest is 
perceived  
 Reasons for raising money in the 
future when the company plans to 
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buy another firm  
 Advisory Board (AB) as 
mentors consisting of three 
persons 
 Communication with them 
almost on a daily basis 
 Mentors helped to raise the 
perspective higher 
 
 Product Advisory Board (PAB) 
consists of five advisors on 
product development 
 Meetings with PAB once a 
quarter, honest feedback and 
input from them, but not a source 
for finding a vision  
 Company was established in an 
incubator, much support from the 
mother company at the beginning 
Low capital intensity  Main source of capital is 
people and the intellectual 
property created by them 
 Well scalable business - 
profit grows independently 
from costs, income does not 
depend 1:1 on the amount of 
money, time or materials put 
into the company 
 
 
Employee ownership  Shares as a means of locking 
valuable employees into the 
firm 
 Symbolic size of shares 
 No increased power in 
strategic decision making 
 No financial benefits coming 
from these 
 No belief in fast and big 
growth in the next couple of 
years 
 Giving shares instead of 
salary, all at once 
 Motivation through seeing 
the relation between one‟s 
own work results and 
company‟s value 
 Challenge is to measure 
one‟s impact to the whole  
 Shares as a source of locking 
valuable employees into the firm 
 Dividing shares according to a 
matrix based on responsibility 
 Having shares increases peer 
control  
Company‟s culture  “Closed system”, workers 
coming from a network of 
friends 
 Trust between workers, 
good specialization as 
everyone is familiar with 
others‟ strengths and 
weaknesses 
 Collaboration culture, 
marketing and engineering 
collaborate in the work processes 
 A strong geek culture 
 Familiar communication, good 
accessibility of leaders 
 Informal events after work  
 Preserving the culture in a global 
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 Strong internal motivation 
for working together 
 No visual chain of 
command 
 Providing autonomy to 
knowledge workers 
 Difficult for newcomers to 
adapt to the existing  
group of friends 
 No informal meetings with 
colleagues after work 
company perceived as a challenge  
 Learning culture, obligatory 
learning and self-development 
 Participating in international 
conferences 
 Hosting an IT conference 
 Presenting the products at the 
conferences as a marketing 
approach 
 
Company‟s structure  Organic leadership culture 
that emphasizes no hierarchy 
and no formal leadership in 
the company  
 Organization culture 
described as everything 
based on consensus and free 
will 
 Horizontal team structure 
 Founders have stronger 
decision making power than 
others 
 Possibility to carry out 
changes very quickly and 
flexibility in decisions, rapid 
adjusting capability 
 Personal ad hoc approach to 
employees by CEO 
 Familiar communication, 
good accessibility of the 
leaders 
 
 Hybrid structure with no strict 
hierarchy in communication, clear 
hierarchy in responsibility 
 Increased autonomy and 
creativity for employers 
 Less control over employees 
 Visually unremarkable structure  
 Hierarchy is revealed in the 
meetings, the organizing of 
others‟ work, amount of traveling 
opportunities 
 In the meetings logical 
argumentation counts  
 Easy access to leaders 
 No standardized ways of 
executing 
management/leadership; rather 
adapting to the situation 
 No visual difference between 
leaders and employees 
 
 
Table 4. Managerial challenges of the studied cases. 
MANAGERIAL 
CHALLENGES 
CASE 1 CASE 2 
Fast growth as 
challenge 
 A different kind of 
leadership may be needed 
 Decrease of motivation on 
the employee side 
 Fast growth, 2-4 times per year 
 Belief that things (communication, 
org. culture, etc.) get worse with 
growth 
 Lack of workforce 
 Inefficiency in the transition period 
 Difficult to build up a new 
predictable product 
 Difficult to get an understanding of 
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income and outgoings, and to adjust 
the analytics needed for the growth 
situation  
Employee 
bargaining power 
 Preference of autonomy 
by the key employees 
 
 
 Key workers with strong previous 
experience in the industry have 
strong bargaining power  
 Small risk that key engineers will 
start their own business 
 No fear for competitors to head hunt 
key engineers  
 Risk of the job getting boring for 
some employees  
Job market and 
recruiting 
 
 Recruits locally 
 The company is not 
attractive challenge for 
best professionals 
 Employees are “good 
enough” 
 Lack of good 
professionals in a small 
country 
 Strict budget for hiring 
from abroad 
 No belief in working from 
distance 
 Recruits globally from Europe and 
the U.S.  
 Engineers recruited locally 
 High prerequisites combined with in-
firm training  
 Recruiting experienced workers to 
balance the young age of company‟s 
founders and workers 
 Too slow growth and output of 
engineers from the local universities 
 No possibility of recruiting students 
 Scepticism towards long distance 
working in engineering  
Low predictability 
in the IT sector 
  Low predictability in launching a 
new product, seizing a new market 
etc.  
 Need for launching new products to 
disperse risks 
 Continuous change in strategies is 
required 
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5. Discussion 
 
In order to discuss the phenomena at hand, I first provide a short summary of the main 
differences between these cases. Then I explain why my chosen cases are examples of 
(international) start-ups, propose a three layer model to discuss their characteristics and show 
how these cases are related to the distinctive category of professional service firms. Further 
on I compare my results with the existing taxonomy of PSFs and address some issues raised 
in criticism against the theory of PSFs. 
 
As the previous chapter indicated, the studied cases could be characterized by many different 
peculiarities and challenges; some of these can be tied directly to certain factors behind them, 
others seem to have rather indirect connections. When trying to summarize the differences 
between these two cases succinctly, the distinguishing element would be their main service as 
the basis for the company‟s success in the market. ZeroTurnaround has a strong niche market 
product which is technically sophisticated and therefore harder for competitors to imitate. 
Due to this, they managed to start selling the product internationally straight from the 
beginning and their operation costs were covered by sales. Because of this and their strong 
product, they had the opportunity to build up a competitive international team, sales 
department in Boston, etc. In addition to this, their organizational culture is a distinguishing 
starting point, although in general in both cases the founders believe in informality and 
opposition to bureaucracy. ZeroTurnaround has moved to a hierarchical organizational 
structure due to the larger number of employees. Edicy differs from ZeroTurnaround by 
establishing a product in a market that is already filled with many competitors, although 
others are mainly providing their service in English not in German, French, Spanish, 
Norwegian and other less common languages as Edicy does. Nevertheless, for Edicy it is 
harder to stand out among competitors. In addition, developing the product has taken time 
and resources, and the lack of strong and continual investor support had to be replaced by 
earning money for the development with Fraktal. Due to this, Edicy has had a somewhat 
slower start and is not yet present in other markets with its sales and marketing. However, the 
company has started a rapid growth period since the beginning of 2012. 
 
However, although at slightly different development stages, both of the studied cases 
represent start-up companies with their specific peculiarities and challenges arising from 
their common wider context. I hereby rely on the non-orthodox view of start-ups which does 
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not believe that being a start-up marks just the first development stage by each company. I 
support the alternative definition by Ries, who defines start-up as “a human institution 
designed to deliver a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty” (Ries 
2011: 27) and that is for several reasons. First, the orthodox definition by Luger and Koo 
(2005) excludes subsidiaries and branches of existing firms from the start-up category. I‟ve 
found the opposite evidence for this: ZeroTurnaround was initially a branch of an 
international software company, yet, based on its activities back then, it has now evolved into 
a successful example of a start-up. According to Ries start-ups can be found inside bigger 
companies as well. “Anyone who is creating a new product or business under conditions of 
extreme uncertainty is an entrepreneur whether he or she knows it or not and whether 
working in a government agency, a venture-backed company, a nonprofit, or a decidedly for-
profit company with financial investors” (Ries 2011: 27). Second, the human institution 
element in the definition provided by Ries means that the value such a company creates lies 
in its people and organization rather than in the product. This last interpretation I find closer 
to knowledge intensive companies and knowledge workers who are seen as the core asset in 
certain types of (professional service) firms. In addition, as I will show further, I have found 
evidence for knowledge intensity in my cases. Third, my findings support the existence of the 
core element in this definition – the extreme environmental uncertainty. For these three 
reasons I argue that the non-orthodox view of start-ups is well suited to the nature of 
software development start-ups.  
 
Both the cases in focus are international start-ups, as their nature is consistent with the 
international start-up definition, meaning “a new venture that exhibits an innate propensity to 
engage in a meaningful level of international business activity at or near inception, with the 
intent of achieving strategic competitive advantage” (Johnson 2001: 16). Both of these 
companies had an international vision and displayed actions towards this right from their 
inception. Nevertheless, the studied cases lacked prior wide international experience of the 
founders, and in addition, one of them is founded by high technology scientists, which 
according to former research is perceived as a risk for the company‟s management (Moore 
1994; Johnson 2001). These potential challenges are solved in ZeroTurnaround through 
hiring from outside to create an internationally experienced management team and constant 
learning on the company founders‟ side.  
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To further explain the international start-up nature of the studied cases, I will reflect upon it 
through the distinction of international new ventures, offered by Oviatt and McDougall 
(1994). According to this, both of these cases are somewhere between the categories of 
multinational traders and global start-ups, though belonging more to the first one. 
Multinational traders are perceived as the most difficult type of start-ups as both geographic 
and activity coordination is required (Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 60). This means these firms 
are “moving goods from nations where they are to nations where they are demanded. (...) 
Direct investment in any country is typically kept a minimum” (Oviatt & McDougall 1994: 
58). In the case of Edicy, the service is provided from Estonia, although its customers are 
spread all over the world and a certain amount of marketing is conducted in other countries as 
well. In the case of ZeroTurnaround, engineering and development is done in Estonia, 
although marketing support comes from Prague and sales from Boston. Nevertheless, as the 
job market for engineers is limited in such a small country, moving a part of the product 
development side to other countries may become a reality in the future and thus, the company 
will move more towards becoming a global start-up. In addition to this, these companies are 
already now orientated to the global market. This is done because of the need for these 
products is similar worldwide; global orientation would allow rapid growth and higher 
revenue, and their competitors are also acting globally. However, it is questionable if the 
companies will become pure global start-ups in the future: in the case of such software 
development services, no long value chain of activities is needed and therefore, acting 
parallel on the production side in several countries is not indispensable. Although these cases 
cannot be defined as pure global start-ups or pure multinational traders, it is clear that these 
belong in the general category of international start-ups.  
 
As the current empirical findings revealed, the two cases in focus can be described by various 
characteristics. In order to systematize these characteristics and to show their relations with 
former studies on start-ups and professional service firms, I will present a model that consists 
of three layers: general industrial, start-up and other context specific peculiarities; 
organization specific peculiarities, and employee specific peculiarities (Figure 2 below).  
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Figure 2. A three layer model of software development start-ups. 
 
1) The widest category that surrounds the other, more specific, peculiarities is called 
“General industrial, start-up and other context specific peculiarities”. This category 
reflects the environment for high tech start-up companies, with the specific characteristics 
and challenges that these organizations have to face. Based on my cases, this category 
involves notions like low predictability in the IT sector, usage of investors and mentors, fast 
growth and low capital intensity. Along with others, these peculiarities are found to be 
common to start-ups in previous studies and they have occurred in my empirical findings as 
well. 
 
Low predictability in the IT sector is marked as a common challenge for start-ups in general; 
it is even seen as a core of the definition of start-up firms, as presented by Ries (2011). As 
start-up companies operate in a field that is extremely uncertain, their risks cannot be 
calculated beforehand, their future is not predictive and therefore, totally different ways of 
operation and management have to be employed. For these reasons, these firms do not qualify 
for bank loans and they have to find other external financing, which leads to the usage of 
venture capitalists, angel investors and other investment sources (Ries 2011). This 
observation is supported by my findings – low predictability in the industry and the 
involvement of investors is a reality in both cases. 
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Although it is believed that investors are financially not indispensable – it may be possible to 
finance the company by sales straight from the beginning and thus, avoid dependence upon 
external actors, even though this may mean a slower start for the firm - their role as mentors 
is perceived as essential. Using mentors for industry and business advice, and their 
connections for networking, is another way to manage the uncertainty. Mentors do not have 
to be tied to the firms through company shares, although in my cases they mostly are; they 
may be found, for example, among former partners as well. However, in former studies, I 
found this aspect had received not enough attention. 
 
Another peculiarity in this category is the fast growth that is expected from start-up 
companies. Although a lot of effort is put into the chance to grow, both of my cases 
expressed a certain fear for this and its effects on the organization. This peculiarity is 
characteristic of the successful start-ups for several reasons. First, it is related to the 
uncertainty and usage of investors‟ money, which leads to high expectations on performance 
from the investors‟ side. Second, fast growth often comes from the firm‟s internationalization 
strategy. As Bürgel and Murray note, these firms have “a tendency to enter several foreign 
markets within a short time-span” (Bürgel & Murray 2000: 35-36). These bold moves either 
lead to fast growth of the company, or, in the case of incorrect decisions, fast decline. 
Another factor behind this is the “international vision” of start-up founders, which promotes 
rapid growth and which is found distinctive to international start-ups in general (Bürgel 
1999). Thus, this peculiarity characterizes start-ups in general and therefore, to some extent it 
influences these organizations in spite of their internal ways of behaviour.  
 
Low capital intensity is a common characteristic by start-ups in the software development 
sector. In this area, it is the intellectual capital that creates the competitive advantage for 
firms, not non-human assets like factories, inventory, patents, etc. Although this aspect is 
closely related to the importance, bargaining power and management of key employees (thus, 
the third layer on the scheme, named “Employee specific peculiarities”), this peculiarity is 
that wide and unchangeable by these firms, that it affects their behaviour as a background 
factor. 
 
Former studies on start-ups, especially small high technology start-ups, have found other 
distinguishable characteristics that could also be placed in the category of “General industrial 
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and start-up peculiarities”. These can be, for example, the international origin of these firms, 
which is tied to the international commitment of start-up founders (Oviatt & McDougall 
1994), need for customer-driven product design (Johnson 2001), etc. Although these also 
may be seen as organizational responses to some certain factors, they could be perceived as 
peculiarities of the industrial/start-up environment, which lead to specific actions at the 
organizational and/or employee level. However, the purposed category is open for future 
research, as due to limitations on the sample side, as of now, it consists of only a few 
examples. 
 
As indicated before, all of these notions described here are closely related to each other and 
therefore, some of them could be seen as responses to the other (e.g., the usage of investors as 
a solution for extreme uncertainty). However, I find this distinction leads to unnecessary 
diffusion inside a category and therefore, not helpful for creating a wide picture of the type of 
companies in focus. 
 
Thus, this widest layer establishes a background and basis for analysing IT start-up 
companies in detail. It connects the most general prerequisites and peculiarities that affect 
these companies due to their belonging to start-up companies in the software development 
field. Several important characteristics of IT start-ups belong to this category and arise 
thus from their specific industrial/start-up environment, and they affect the 
organization either directly or indirectly. Therefore, when trying to integrate former 
studies on IT start-ups and professional service firms, this is the aspect where the scientific 
knowledge about start-ups has an important role to play. A step forward in understanding 
these firms as well as possible is done by looking at the methods these companies have 
employed to respond to these challenges.  
 
2) I call the next layer on the graph “Organization specific peculiarities” as these are 
characteristics that are created by the organization itself, in order to respond to the challenges 
coming from general industrial/start-up peculiarities, and to effectively fulfil its own 
purposes. As the start-up approach of Ries indicates, “entrepreneurship is management” and 
each institution needs to adapt its management specially for handling the extreme uncertainty 
of the environment (Ries 2011: 8-9). This layer, as well as both the other two, is thus to a 
great extent related to the other layers around it. In my cases, this category involves firm-
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specific characteristics like organizational routines, company‟s culture; company‟s structure 
and physical working environment. 
 
Organizational routines like team meetings, employee operations, working time regulations, 
everyday communication and so on, have been established to create efficiency and high 
performance, but also as an answer to the expectations and challenges coming from the 
employee side, as well as the industry level in general. Plurality of roles of the key persons 
may also be seen as a common element in both firms, but on the other hand it is a peculiarity 
that is strongly correlated to the uncertainty in the industry. However, as previously noted, 
displaying entrepreneurial and goal-driven internal organizational behaviour is noted to be a 
success factor among start-ups (Johnson 2001). In my studied cases organizational routines 
overlapped to a great extent, which refers to a common way of thinking about organizational 
operations in these types of firms. Also the physical working environment of these cases was 
in principle very similar. In general, it expressed the modern, open and accessible 
environment of the company, thus complementing their familiar organizational culture and 
informal structure, and offering employees some possibilities for entertainment besides their 
rather monotonous work behind computers. 
 
Company‟s structure and culture are two aspects that are closely connected to each other, yet 
somewhat different in my studied cases. However, a tendency occurred - the organizational 
culture seemed to become more thought out and detailed when the company‟s size and 
structure grows. Former studies on start-ups indicate that successful start-ups have close/tight 
co-ordination (Johnson 2001). This point was supported in my findings as well: these cases 
can be characterized by informality in communication, excellent accessibility of leaders, a lot 
of ad hoc communication and a firm culture that emphasizes the fun side of working in the 
company and the equal position of employees and leaders inside the firm. 
 
Thus, organization specific peculiarities act like a medium between the two groups of strong 
elements (those coming from the distinguishable nature of the general environment of the 
firms and those affected by the organizational dependence of its key employees). An 
important task for such a company is to find the best suitable organizational means to match 
these different sides and solve the challenges arising from those. This is often done through 
specific methods that fall under this category. 
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3) The third layer on the graph is called “Employee specific peculiarities” and it involves 
both characteristics and challenges related to the workforce. This category is directly tied to 
low capital intensity which characterizes start-ups in the software development sector, as due 
to this, intellectual capital has moved to the centre of these firms and forms a basis for 
competitive advantage in this industry. On the other hand, this is an aspect that has 
undeservedly received little attention in the former literature on start-ups. As at the core of 
my studied cases are knowledge intensity and knowledge workers, this layer could be well 
seen through the lenses of knowledge intensive professional service firms. Thus, this layer 
provides an opportunity to establish a link between start-ups and professional service firms, 
and therefore, to transform the valuable knowledge from one sphere to the other: from the 
sphere of professional service firms to provide a better understanding of software 
development start-ups.  
 
At the core of this category lies knowledge intensity that creates a basis for the company‟s 
competitive advantage. Both of my studied firms provide a service that involves a certain 
amount of specific, esoteric knowledge about the field. One of them has established a service 
that is very complex and technically difficult and therefore, requires expert knowledge on the 
engineering side. The other company provides a service that connects expert knowledge on 
the design and programming side. Thus, both examples can be defined by the term 
“knowledge intensive company”. According to Starbuck (1992) an important element to this 
is that the company relies on esoteric expertise instead of widely shared knowledge and that 
knowledge is not confused with simple flow of information. In my researched cases, neither 
commonplace knowledge nor flow of information is an actual issue. According to 
Nordenflycht, being a professional service firm means that “the firm relies on an 
intellectually skilled workforce, not just among its executive or support functions (e.g., 
R&D), but also among its “frontline workers” (Nordenflycht 2010: 159). This is the case here 
as well, as some frontline workers are at the same time their key knowledge workers, who put 
effort into developing the services and who hold this esoteric knowledge essential for 
company‟s operations. Hence, I argue that software development start-ups can be seen as 
professional service firms.  
 
Based on my studied cases, several codes could be placed under this category, which are 
closely tied to each other. These codes are: knowledge workers; motivation of knowledge 
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workers; employee ownership; employee bargaining power and job market and recruiting. It 
is the presence of esoteric knowledge that is expressed through these different codes in this 
category. Thus, these named characteristics of an IT start-up are coming from the company‟s 
knowledge intensity, which shows that knowledge intensity affects their nature and 
operations to quite a large extent. Similarly to the organizational/managerial peculiarities 
arising from the industrial/start-up environment, knowledge intensity plays a crucial role in 
those firms. Knowledge workers in these companies are mainly motivated intrinsically 
through the challenge of working with services that have such a high potential. Their 
motivation is supported by providing them autonomy in their work, informal relations with 
co-workers and leaders, company shares and so on. Both of the companies noted the 
challenge related to the job market situation for those expert workers and difficulties related 
to hiring these workers. This means that knowledge workers are very valuable for these 
companies and also hard to recruit. Their situation secures them a good position when 
bargaining on one‟s salary, working conditions, etc., although it is not perceived that this 
bargaining power has been used in reality. The existence of many interrelated aspects 
which all reflect knowledge intensity in those firms, supports the claim that these firms 
could be analysed through the PSF lenses.  
 
These relations between the codes within this category are also described in the theory of 
professional service firms. The taxonomy of PSFs compares certain types of companies using 
three main characteristics; five managerial challenges and opportunities, and four 
organizational responses. My findings cover only a few of these aspects, which are 
knowledge intensity and low capital intensity as peculiarities; cat herding as a challenge and 
alternative compensation, autonomy and informality as organizational responses to the named 
challenge. Thus, in addition to the fact that software development start-ups can be seen 
as professional service firms, I argue that these are characterized by some common PSF 
peculiarities, challenges and organizational responses. 
 
However, Nordenflycht has pointed to some other peculiarities which I did not find to be 
supported by my empirical findings. As a starting point, he identified three distinctive 
features common to professional service firms, which are knowledge intensity, low capital 
intensity and professionalized workforce; although, not all of these have to be present in 
every professional service firm. In the current cases, neither of the studied companies can be 
characterized by their professionalization level. It is rather the opposite: researched start-ups 
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in software development tend to oppose themselves to everything that is prescribed by formal 
associations. They aim to approach issues when they occur and not beforehand using some 
book or following codes of conduct set by formal institutions. Professionalization is often 
seen as a response to the opaque quality problem, but I did not find any support for this 
challenge in the current cases either. As in these companies, their essential knowledge is 
incorporated into specific services and presented as products, evaluating their quality has not 
become an issue on the customer side. If the product works properly and looks fine, it is 
perceived as having good quality. In case of problems with the product, its quality will be 
revalued. In both cases, customers feel they can decide over the quality and although they are 
not familiar with the code and other technical settings behind the product, lack of knowledge 
about it is not seen as a barrier. The products speak for themselves and therefore, it is not 
necessary for the firm to signal its quality through professionalization. Muted competition 
and the trusteeship norm are other challenges that are closely related to professionalization of 
occupations and thus, these have not occurred in the current cases either. In addition to these, 
I have found no support from my empirical findings for organizational slack. Rather vice 
versa - although fewer formal rules, more autonomy and informality would suggest higher 
risk for this - organizational slack is prevented by hiring employees with strong internal 
motivation and with proper expectations for the job, and creating an organizational culture 
that helps to avoid this. Thus, a lot of these missing characteristics come from lack of 
professionalization in this sector.  
 
In addition, some other former statements on knowledge intensive firms and PSFs are in 
conflict with the current findings. The definition of KIFs provided by Sveiby and Risling 
describe their production as “non-standardized, creative, strongly dependent of the individual 
and complexly problem-solving” (Sveiby & Risling 1987: 17). In the case of Edicy and 
ZeroTurnaround, the production is rather standardized and little dependent on the individual, 
although in some situations tailor-made adjustments have to be made. Hill and Neely describe 
a PSF as a type of firm where the client is significantly dependent on the provider to define 
the problem and give appropriate advice (Lu 20053: 13). This does not apply to my cases 
either, instead of a one-to-one advisory relationship between the client and the PSF provider, 
expert knowledge is rather embodied in a packaged service solution. The fact that 
professional services are delivered by professionals/knowledge workers is very characteristic 
to management consulting, law firms and other classical examples of PSFs, but in my studied 
cases the company‟s frontline workers with esoteric knowledge on the field are not involved 
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in everyday communication with customers. This is mainly done by the sales department and 
customer service employees. Key frontline workers speak at conferences and represent the 
firm in the case of important customers. Therefore, many aspects that characterize Classic 
PSFs are missing in the case of start-ups in the software development industry.  
 
This clear distinction of Classic PSFs from other kinds of PSFs, and at the same time 
strong knowledge intensity within these firms, is proof of the need for a taxonomy of 
PSFs. In this regard I support the issue raised by Nordenflycht (2010), finding that the mess 
around this term is a barrier for creating a meaningful and relevant body of knowledge about 
these special types of firms. Focusing only on Classic PSFs is misleading, while describing 
the complex and developing nature of PSFs only by its various peculiarities, leads to 
generalizability problems. Unless the division into different types of firms takes place, it 
would be harder to see the relationship between start-ups and PSFs and therefore, also less 
likely for these schools of thought (and the increasing number of practitioners) to learn from 
each other. 
 
Nevertheless, according to the initial typology of PSFs created by Nordenflycht, it has not 
been clear into which category software development firms could be placed or even more 
specifically, if software development start-ups could suit the typology of PSFs. Based on my 
findings, I have argued that software development start-ups could be seen as professional 
service firms and they are characterized by knowledge intensity and low capital intensity, cat 
herding challenges, and the usage of alternative compensation methods, autonomy and 
informality as organizational responses. Using these characteristics these start-ups are then 
distinguishable from the other suggested categories like Technology Developers and Neo-
PSFs (see Table 5 below). Different from Technology Developers, relatively little capital is 
needed and no opaque quality challenge is perceived, although these types of firms stand 
close to each other in terms of using alternative compensation mechanisms and providing 
autonomy and informality. Compared to Neo-PSFs, low capital intensity and opaque quality 
are the distinguishable elements here as well. In addition to these, in my studied cases cat 
herding is perceived as a rather small challenge and thus somewhat less attention is paid to 
autonomy, informality and alternative compensation as organizational responses to this 
challenge. Different from Neo-PSFs, in software development start-ups outside ownership 
and investor protection are common practices. A peculiarity that all these compared types 
have in common, but which differentiates those from other types of firms in the taxonomy, is 
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the lack of a professionalized workforce. I have proposed the possible reasons for this earlier 
in this chapter. When comparing these features with the existing taxonomy of PSFs, these 
firms would not suit directly into either of the categories and therefore, an additional 
category would be needed.  
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Table 5. Taxonomy and Theory of Knowledge Intensive Firms by Nordenflycht (2010), supplemented by the author of current thesis. 
 Characteristics Challenges and Opportunities Organizational Responses 
Category 
(with 
examples) 
Knowledge 
intensity 
Low 
Capital 
Intensity 
Professio-
nalized 
Workforce 
Cat 
Herding 
Opaque 
Quality 
No 
Investor 
Protec-
tions 
Trustee-
ship 
Norm 
Muted 
Competi-
tion 
Alter-
native 
Com-
pensation 
Auto-
nomy 
and 
Infor-
mality 
No 
Outside 
Owner-
ship 
Slack 
Software 
Development 
Start-ups 
X X  V     V VV   
Technology 
Developers: 
Biotech 
R&D labs 
X   V V    V V   
Neo-PSFs: 
Consulting 
Advertising 
X X  VV V V   VV VVV V  
Professional 
Campuses: 
Hospitals 
X  X VV V  V V VV VVV V V 
Classic PSFs: 
Law 
Accounting 
Architecture 
X X X VVV V V V V VVV VVVVV VV V 
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I will further reflect upon some aspects of the critique of Zardkoohi et al.2011) towards the 
theory of PSFs presented by Nordenflycht (2010). Their critique stated that more important 
than trying to define the nature of PSFs, is to see how a given service becomes optimally 
organized if the context changes and they considered context as a main factor behind the cat 
herding challenge, decentralized structure and autonomy at work, etc. I hereby agree with 
these scholars, as the current empirical findings prove the contextual influence on the 
peculiarities on all the organization‟s layers. Even further, I hypothesize that to some 
extent, the closeness of firms (or categories of firms) in the taxonomy of PSFs may be an 
effect of their common or similar context instead of the common nature. An example 
here could be issues related to low capital intensity, investor protections and outside 
ownership. The context of start-ups and software development industry is extreme in the way 
that it is very unpredictable and full of competitors, yet it may be relatively simple for 
establishing a successful start-up without significant material resources. Nevertheless, the 
extreme uncertainty requires extreme financing solutions. But in case of removing the word 
“start-up” from this type of firm and trying to place software development firms into this 
taxonomy, their position would be different due to their more secure and stable context, 
although the nature of their work, their services and other conditions may be identical. 
 
Zardkoohi et al. (2011) have argued against Nordenflycht, who has explained the autonomy 
provided for knowledge workers coming from their clear preference for it and their strong 
bargaining power. Zardkoohi et al. do not agree with this explanation, meaning that the job 
market situation is the real factor behind the cat-like behaviour of some employees, not their 
valuable knowledge. In addition, they argue that providing autonomy is an organizational 
response to the decentralized information held by professionals/knowledge workers and this 
solution is just as efficient for the organization. In my studied cases, both points were 
confirmed: autonomy was preferred by knowledge workers, but also it was provided by the 
leaders for organizational efficiency reasons. Although the job market situation was 
perceived as a challenge for the company, no specific cat herding problems had arisen in 
these companies. Thus, autonomy and informality in these companies were provided both for 
employees‟ well-being and for increased creativity in their work from which the company in 
general can benefit. In other words, these reasons can be categorized into the layers of 
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“Employee specific peculiarities” and “Organization specific peculiarities” rather than 
among contextual factors. 
 
To get a full understanding of software development start-up characteristics and the relations 
between these, I suggest viewing these firms through the different layers these companies 
consist of. I have proposed a three layer model which integrates influences and characteristics 
from the existing body of knowledge on start-ups and the software development industry, 
with peculiarities and knowledge coming from the knowledge worker side. In the middle of 
these exists the human-created organization with its specific values and behaviour as chosen 
means to tie these two extremes successfully together. Such a model takes into account the 
context of these firms and thus brings the analysis of organization closer to the principles of 
Zardkoohi et al. In addition, the proposed model helps to distinguish context from other 
peculiarities and influences, allowing focus on specific groups of characteristics separately 
from the context factors. In the current thesis, this approach has led to the possibility to 
discover the existing relationship between start-ups and PSFs.  
 
For future research I suggest testing the proposed model on other types of PSFs and also to 
further study the category of IT start-ups in the PSF typology. It would be interesting to see if 
this category with its specific characteristics coincides with other types of start-ups and thus, 
if these results could be generalized to a wider selection of start-up companies. In addition, it 
would be necessary for the theory of PSFs to test if the closeness of firms (or categories of 
firms) in the taxonomy of PSFs may be an effect of their common or similar context instead 
of the common nature of these firms. A model that distinguishes different layers within 
organizations could be helpful in this research. In the empirical findings section I have 
thrown light on many different aspects that are common within IT start-ups, but as the 
purpose of the current thesis was the clarification of concepts, I have not analysed each of 
them in detail. To fully understand the nature of this specific and valuable new phenomenon 
named IT start-up, it is worth studying more about those aspects.  
 
So, does the attention to the employee side of start-ups expand the understanding of start-ups 
and help them to overcome their challenges? I suggest that it does. I find that both parties – 
scholars on start-up companies and professional service firms - would benefit from 
learning from each other. Clear links between these schools exist and in cases like start-ups 
that are based on some kind of esoteric knowledge, influences from both schools are situated 
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side-by-side in their everyday organizational life. Viewing start-ups through the existing 
theory and concepts of PSFs adds an additional dimension to the already proven relations, 
causes and consequences, to this body of knowledge. Vice versa, showing new evidence of 
the diffuse nature of professional service firm as a phenomenon keeps the search for the best 
suiting definition or typology of PSFs active. As contexts are in constant change, so too are 
the industries and types of organizations. Just as start-ups arise from very different kinds of 
industries and present an important trend in today‟s world, interrelations between disciplines 
and research traditions are needed to understand, generalize and learn from these examples.  
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Appendices 
 
1. Interview guide 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION (depends on the secondary data I've gathered 
beforehands) 
 
 How would you introduce your company? What is it about? What does it „produce“? 
 How long time have you been in the market?  
 How long have you personally been in the company? 
 How do you define your market (is this Estonia, some other countries or the whole 
world?) 
 Who are those people who are your clients – are they enterprises (business clients) or 
is it the mass market (individuals, consumers)?  
 Please give me some insight to the „production“ process. How does it start? Whom 
(which professions, tasks) does it involve? 
 Please describe your own tasks. What is your responsibility, what do you do in the 
company? 
 
2. POSSIBLE PECULARITY 1: Knowledge intensity.  
 
 How many employees does the company currently have?  
 What kind of knowledge do these employees have, who participate in the production 
process? Do they have to have some kind of specific knowledge, skills, professional 
knowledge (if yes, then what kind of?)? How important is this for doing the job?  
 Do you require a certain education level? Is it important that your employees have an 
university degree from top universities / from any certain universities, colleges that in 
a way assures the quality of the knowledge? (University of Tartu? Tallinn 
Technological University?) 
 Would you say that your company is a company that is based on knowledge? (a 
knowledge intensive company). Why would you say that?  
 Is that certain specific knowledge your competitive edge? Would you say that the 
production bases on company's (esoteric) expertise or the fact that you have some 
kind of expert knowledge in your industry? Or is it mainly the widely shared 
knowledge / flow of information that is the key asset? 
 In what extent could one say that the company relies on employees with certain 
intellectual skills, and this is relevant both among managers and „key employees“ 
(those who actually create the product)? 
 
3. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THIS:  
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 We now talked about the knowledge intensity of your company. What does this mean 
to your organisation? Do you think this peculiarity somehow affects the everyday life 
in your organisation? How?  
 
 What does this pecularity mean to you as the leader/owner? Any specific problems or 
challenges arousing from this? Is it any kind of special to lead such employees?  
 
 How hard is it to find good professional in your field of business? Does the labor 
market have enough good candidates? 
 
 Do you sense that those workers have higher position than others (non knowledge 
intensive employees) to negotiate over salary, working conditions etc? Does the 
company have to be more flexible with those workers? Do they take advantage of that 
power? Are there special conditions created for them compared to others not that 
important from company‟s perspective (who can be replaced more easily)? (for 
example motivation programs – company shares? working from home? business 
trips?) Please give me some examples. 
 
 How difficult it is to manage these workers? How much personal input and 
understanding their individuality have to be taken into consideration instead of 
classical managing, supervision and using official organizational routines? How do 
you lead them?  
 How difficult it is to „hold on“ to these people? Do you consider this as a challenge 
for the company – keep those employees with the company, keep them motivated? Is 
the risk of them finding a job easily in some of your competition thanks to their 
valuable skills real? Do you feel that this sets them in a power position – they‟re free 
to decide in which company they want to work (not the other way around, where 
company has more independence since there is a lot workforce available in the labor 
market)? What do you do to hold on to them? 
 How would you define quality in your company's work? Please describe a high 
quality work / product in your business. Is it easy for a customer to evaluate the 
quality of your work? How (based by what) can he/she do it? 
 
4. POSSIBLE PECULARITY 2:  Low capital intensity. 
 Would you say that the key resource of your company is the knowledge of your 
employees, not any kind of material capital (technology, inventures, property etc)?  
 How important is non-human capital in your everyday work? 
 
5. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THIS:  
 
 We now talked about the low capital intensity of your company. What does this mean 
to your organisation? Do you think this peculiarity does somehow affects the 
everyday life in your organisation? How?  
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 What does this pecularity mean to you as the leader/owner? Any specific problems or 
challenges arousing from this? 
 
 Do you need investor protections in order to keep the company going?  
 
6. POSSIBLE PECULARITY 3: Professionalized workforce.  
 
 Do you have a dominate professional association (either in Estonia or a global one) in 
which you have to belong to make business in this industry? If yes, then how 
important is belonging to this in the context of Estonia / world? What is the main 
thing it provides to its members? In which issues it helps? 
 
 In your company, approximately how many employees are members of this 
association? 
 Do you have to have some kind of licence in order to start doing business in this 
industry? How important is the licence to be a successful / reliable actor in the 
market? Who provides that licence? 
 Is there any ethical code your business activity is based on? Or if one wants to be 
successful in this speciality, does one have to take account of an certain ethical code? 
Who provides that ethical code? 
 Approximately what is the percent of your firm‟s workforce belonging to such 
professionalized occupations (who may consider belonging to these professional 
associations, relying on ethical codes etc)? 
 How can your clients be sure of the quality of your products/work? What signals 
quality to them? 
 
7. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THIS:  
 
 We now talked about the professionalized workforce of your company. What does this 
mean to your organisation? Do you think this peculiarity does somehow affects the 
everyday life in your organisation? How?  
 
 What does this pecularity mean to you as the leader/owner? Any specific problems or 
challenges arousing from this?  
 
8. POSSIBLE PECULARITY 4: Informal leadership processes.  
 
 What does the term „leadership“ mean to you, considered your everyday work? 
 
 What kind of routines do you have? What kind of formal routines do you have (the 
ones you have to do regularly because of your job description)?  
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 Do you have any kind of informal routines that you do regularly (f.ex. motivating 
employees, asking about their personal life etc)? How often does your job involve 
personal approach to employees? What kind of informal routines these are? Please 
give me some examples. 
 
 How do you feel, in your everyday work – what is the relationship between formal 
and informal leading methods? 
 
 Please describe me the organisational structure of your company. Is it hierarchical? 
How many different hierarchy levels are there in the company? 
 
 In what extent the employees (especially these so-called knowledge intensive 
workers, professionals) in their everyday work can act autonomously? How does it 
emerge? In what extent do they have to report to a person standing above themselves 
in the hierarchy? In what extent do the workers in higher hierarchy levels have to 
control other who stand below them? Do you have some kind of „collegial control“ 
between the professionals? Please give me some examples.  
 
 Let's talk a little about the firm-level decision-making in your company. For example 
when it comes to deciding the product development issues – who usually says the 
final word here? Who decides that kind of issues? Is it leaders in some level or owners 
or professionals together?  Why? 
 
 Are the leader positions in your company well defined and belong to certain 
employees/job descriptions? Or is handling the leadership issues rather divided 
between several employees or considered as a part time job? Do you have rotation 
between leader positions – that means, once one division is responsible for example 
customer service,  next time for production side etc? Or once an employee is 
responsible for leading the marketing side, next time for customer service etc? If yes, 
then why did you implement this order? 
 
9. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THIS:  
 
 We now talked about some informal leadership processes of your company. What 
does this mean to your organisation? Do you think this peculiarity does somehow 
affects the everyday life in your organisation? How?  
 
 What does this pecularity mean to you as the leader/owner? Any specific problems or 
challenges arousing from this? 
 
 
10. POSSIBLE PECULARITY 5: Employee partnership / ownership. 
 
 How is the company ownership / shares divided? Are there also employees among the 
company's owners? 
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 Are the partners usually selected inside the company (among the workers) or from 
outside? Why is that? 
 
 What about the leaders – are the leading positions usually filled by persons inside the 
company or outside? How does it affect the company and its everyday work? 
 
11. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THIS:  
 
 We now talked about the employee ownership of your company. What does this mean 
to your organisation? Do you think this peculiarity does somehow affects the 
everyday life in your organisation? How?  
 
 What does this pecularity mean to you as the leader/owner? Any specific problems or 
challenges arousing from this?  
 
 Do you have anything else to add about the topic(s)? Anything else about the 
company that I should know? 
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2. A Typology of Professional Service Firms. 
 
 
Source: Nordenflycht 2007: 45. 
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3. Asset Intensities.  
 
 
Source: Nordenflycht 2007: 44. 
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4. Used secondary data sources 
  
Annual Report Fraktal 
Annual Report ZeroTurnaround 
URL: http://ajaveeb.ekspress.ee/toivo/ambitsioonikas-tonu-runnel/ (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://arvamus.postimees.ee/590854/targo-tennisberg-itimees-kui-kunstnik/ (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://geekout.ee/zeroturnaround-toob-eestisse-rahvusvaheliselt-tuntud-java-arendajad/ 
(Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://hei.eas.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1657:tartlased-
tegid-programmeerijate-logelemisele-lopu&catid=106:2011-oktoober&Itemid=53 (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://internetmarketing.ee/start-up-tonu-runnel-videoloeng/ (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://zeroturnaround.com/blog/ (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://zeroturnaround.com/blog/an-open-letter-from-jevgeni-kabanov-founder-of-
zeroturnaround/ (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.ap3.ee/?PublicationId=31503ED6-39D4-4163-9D98-
74AA1E3959CE&code=4558/uud_uudidx_455808 (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.ap3.ee/?PublicationId=f62df5cf-f829-4a74-b502-63ed375ef7f7 (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.ap3.ee/article/2011/7/25/webmedia-muus-osaluse-idufirmas (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.director.ee/kuidas-saada-oma-kliendiks-ibm-disney-ja-apple/ (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.edicy.com/blog (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.edicy.com/files/edicy-deck-2011.pdf (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.epl.ee/news/majandus/it-eksperdid-lootustandvaim-firma-on-
zeroturnaround.d?id=63714464 (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.innovationfestival.ee/blog_item.php?bid=775  28.06.201 (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.marketingsutra.com/blog/tonu-runnel/ (Read: 08.03.2012) 
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URL: http://www.seminar.aripaev.ee/images/originalimages/T6nu_Runnel-95cc1.pdf (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.tartupostimees.ee/710960/paras-annus-hullust-viib-ettevotjat-edasi/ (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.ut.ee/et/zeroturnaroundi-asutaja-jevgeni-kabanov-naudib-ettevotte-kiiret-
arengut (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DP3Kka6CcY&feature=related (Read: 
08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3qi6_6bEP0 (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJQ4RnpTvIk&feature=related (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z30eeha3y2E&feature=related (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: https://www.facebook.com/edicy  (Read: 08.03.2012) 
URL: https://www.facebook.com/ZeroTurnaround  (Read: 08.03.2012) 
 
 
 
